CEAD MiLE FAILTE? IRELAND WELCOMES
DIVORCE: THE 1995 IRISH DIVORCE

REFERENDUM AND THE FAMILY (DIVORCE)
ACT OF 1996*
Ideas and beliefs die out, but only when whatever they held of truth and
usefulness to society have been corruptedor diminished, and they will do so

even in a theocracy.

-Marcel Proust (1903)
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 1995, the citizens of tire (the Republic of
Ireland) voted in favor of legislation allowing divorce for the first
time since the country gained independence from Great Britain in
1922. Divorce had been illegal not through any legislative act, but
through an explicit ban in the Irish Constitution itself, necessitating
the country-wide referendum. The margin of victory was a razor-thin
0.6%, and the social ramifications of the referendum and the provisions of its enabling legislation are still hotly debated. The November referendum's success was the culmination of a decades-long series of attempts to liberalize the restrictive family law of the country,
and the victory for the proponents of divorce, by however slim a
margin, is a significant indication of the extent to which the social
role of the Roman Catholic Church is being redefined and diminished in Ireland.
An examination of the reasons for the constitutional establishment of the prohibition of divorce, the history of the struggle for prodivorce legislation, the trends in family law beginning in the 1970s,
and the circumstances surrounding the November 1995 referendum
and resulting legislation will reveal an Ireland that is being transformed socially through a deliberate long-term liberalization of fam*Cad Mile FdHilte is Irish for "one hundred thousand welcomes," a common expression of the
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ily law. To place the issue of divorce in Ireland in its proper context,
it is necessary to explore the existence of a distinctively "Irish identity," the extent to which this identity is properly identified with the
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, and how Ireland's conception of itself as a distinct cultural entity plays out politically. A discussion of the provisional 1922 Constitution of the newly-formed
Irish Free State and its handling of divorce issues sets the stage for an
analysis of the 1937 Constitution and its foundation in Catholic mores.
The legal status of those couples desiring divorce after 1937 is
discussed, from the status quo before the failed 1986 Referendum to
the successful 1995 Referendum and the provisions of its enabling
legislation. The Irish government is shown to have used both direct
and indirect means to shepherd divorce legislation into being; its direct efforts to promote the two referenda were complemented by the
passage of many pieces of social legislation which not only fostered a
climate within which voting for divorce made sense, but also actually
accomplished many of the social goals sought by the divorce proponents. The many political and social motives behind the push for divorce are discussed, from the purely personal to the international; as
are the varying legal strategies used by couples seeking to divorce,
such as appealing to the European Court of Human Rights and other
instrumentalities of the European Union (EU). Finally, some
thoughts about the implications of Ireland's liberalizing family law
are discussed; arguably, the new availability of divorce in the Republic of Ireland will mollify those who found Ireland's family law to be a
stumbling block to reunification talks between the Republic and
Northern Ireland, and may serve to move the debate forward.
H. THE IRISH IDENTITY
Entire forests have been pulped in the process of creating publications which pursue a definition of Irish identity. Scholars, critics,
and crafters of policy have been quick to put pen to paper in the
hopes of codifying, once and for all, what is entailed in being Irish
and how Irish identity is made manifest in the lives of ordinary Irish
citizens. Certainly one of the traits of "Irish-ness" is the strong embrace with which the people of Ireland and the Roman Catholic
Church have held each other.
Historically, the articulation of an Irish identity as a specifically
Catholic identity was most prominently promulgated by Eamon de
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Valera.1 De Valera held up an image of Catholicism that many Irish
men and women had long held-that the spiritually pure life of the
small, rural, and self-sufficient Catholic farmer was the life of a true
Irishman. De Valera summarized his vision:
That Ireland that we dreamed of would be... a land whose coun-

tryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping
of sturdy children, the contests of athletic youths, the laughter of
comely maidens, whose firesides would be the forums for the wisdom of serene old age.2
Catholicism had become for the colonially oppressed Irish a
force With mythic impact and had created in the Irish mind a "Holy
Ireland"; after independence from England, the priests and laymen
who ran the Catholic Church turned their energies, formerly dispensed on the fight for social and religious rights for Catholics in a
Protestant world, inward to the delineation and monitoring of proper
social conduct, as norms for living in the new state were being
formed.3
Although it may seem for many both in and outside Ireland that
the laws on divorce have, like Catholicism, always been a part of the
country's fabric, it was not until the Constitution of 1937 was written
under de Valera's supervision that the absolute prohibition on divorce was established in law. Until the establishment of the Irish
Free State in 1922 divorce was still a legal option for those wealthy
enough to petition Westminster.4 However, both Protestants and
Catholics, North and South, traditionally abhorred divorce.5 In the
1. Eamon de Valera, an American born of an Irish mother, was the father of modem

Ireland. He almost singlehandedly wrote the Irish Constitution of 1937, founded an Irish
newspaper empire, and established the nation's largest political party, Fianna Fail. See TIM P.
COOGAN, EAMONDE VALERA: THE MAN WHO WAS IRELAND 1 (1993).
2. Eamon de Valera, Ir. Press, Mar. 18, 1943, quoted in JENNY BEALE, WOMEN IN
IRELAND: VOICES OF CHANGE 20 (1987).
3. See RIcHARD KEARNEY, TRANsITIONS: NARRATiVES IN MODERN IRISH CULTURE

242-43 (1988).
4. Prior to the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, Parliament, not the courts,
heard divorce petitions, which were costly undertakings; in practice, only the wealthy achieved

termination of their marriages through the passage of private bills in Parliament. Between
1700 and 1857, only 325 divorces were granted to Irish citizens. The Act of 1857, ushering in an
era of middle-class divorces, did not apply to Ireland, whose citizens were still constrained to
seek divorce through a private act in Westminster and incur costs that in 1910 exceeded £500.
Between 1922 and 1937, divorce was technically legal in the Irish Free State, but practically
prohibited, because the new Parliament of the Irish Free State could not agree on revising the
law that had been in force prior to 1922. See David Fitzpatrick, Divorce and Separation in
Modem Irish History, 114 PAST & PRESENT 172,172-75 (1987).
5. See id. at 186. In fact, during the debates regarding divorce law reform in 1857, "few
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nineteenth century, the Royal Commission on Divorce heard testimony that "even Belfast Presbyterians showed 'no desire whatever'
for English-style divorce."6
For de Valera the 1937 Constitution was a means through which
a truly Roman Catholic Ireland could be realized. For him the constitution of any state was to be the conduit through which the socioreligious mores of the country were channeled. Rather than a
document primarily establishing rules and guidelines for the government, the Irish Constitution was to be a document outlining rules by
which the people of Ireland were to organize their lives.' De Valera
remarked on the inseparability of a country's system of laws from its
national mores in a pair of radio broadcasts. In the first, on St. Patrick's day, 1935, de Valera stated that "[s]ince the coming of St. Patrick... Ireland has been a Christian and a Catholic nation .... She
remains a Catholic nation ... ,9 Two years later, when endorsing the
new Constitution on the air, de Valera noted that "[t]here is a stage
in the life of every community in which its customs as well as its philosophy of life pass into laws. A system of law which is divorced from
the convictions, the beliefs and spiritual character of a people is in no
sense a national code."' In light of the increasingly secular nature of
contemporary Irish society, de Valera might, if asked today, have to
admit that elements of the constitutional system that he helped establish in Ireland had indeed become "divorced from the convictions,
the beliefs and spiritual character" of the Irish and had consequently
lost some of its value as Ireland's "national code." Ironically, those
Catholic values that were so important to the national vision of de
Valera are the very views of Ireland that have weakened in recent
years" and that in November 1995 received a significant blow in the
referendum on divorce.
Despite the many social, cultural, and religious transformations
in Ireland since Eamon de Valera's day, many of the cultural and social mainstays of his vision endure and continue to mark Irish culIrish members favored divorce legislation for England, let alone Ireland." Id. at 185.
6. Id. at 186.
7. See ANGELA CLIFFORD, TBE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF IRtE-IRELAND 91, 313
(1985).
8. See id at91.
9. Eamon de Valera (RE radio broadcast, Mar. 17, 1935), quoted in CLIFFORD, supra

note 7, at 15.
10. Eamon de Valera (RE radio broadcast, June 15, 1937), quoted in CLIFFORD, supra

note 7, at 15.
11. See BEALE, supra note 2, at 17.
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ture.' The former President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, realizes that
in general it is "extremely difficult to reach a satisfactory definition of
culture."' But, she continues, there are in particular "certain fundamental characteristics which form part of the cultural inheritance of
all Irish men and women. Certain habits of mind and means of expression have, over the centuries, generated a distinctively Irish vision of the world."' 4 President Robinson admits that even these habits must continue to change, in order to represent contemporary
social circumstance and opinion:
One notices throughout Ireland a keen preoccupation with the Irish
identity, with what it means to be Irish. This has its roots in our
turbulent past and in the continuing division of the present day. It
also stems, however, from the rapid social and economic changes
experienced by most Western countries in recent times and from
the readjustments dictated by our deepening involvement with our
European neighbors. There is a growing recognition that we are

living in a world whose contours are changing with breath-taking
speed and in which the safe certainties of the past are constantly
being challenged. Our identity must be constantly rediscovered, or
re-created, if15we are to come to terms with these changing circumstances ....

Implicit in President Robinson's argument is the recognition that
Ireland still battles with its relationship with the teachings of the
Catholic Church, arguably still the strongest single influence on Ireland's cultural identity. For Ireland to move forward in its relationship with Northern Ireland and to accept comprehensively the responsibilities and benefits of membership in the European Union, the
nation has had to reexamine the extent to which its political and legal
structures are dependent on a religiously informed vision of the
world.
Recognizing this need for change is one matter; a different and
altogether more difficult matter is altering the legal and constitutional system to reflect such change. Vestiges of de Valera's nostalgic view of Ireland certainly still mark the Irish identity, as does the
fact that 95% of the Irish are baptized Catholics.16 Yet since the
1950s, many Irish have become increasingly uncomfortable with the
12. See COOGAN, supra note 1, at 693-704.
13. Keynote address by President Mary Robinson, in CULTURE IN IRELAND-DVISION
OR DIvERsITY?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CULTURES OF IRELAND GROUP CONFERENCE, 27-28
SEPTEMBER, 1991,4 (Edna Longley ed., 1991).

14. Id. at 5.
15. Id.
16. See Albert J. Menendez, Down the EmeraldAisle, CHURCH & STATE, Sept. 1986, at 7.
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extent to which the law and the Church reach into the realm of personal choice, particularly as it relates to abortion and divorce.'
Moreover, the Church's power has waned considerably during the
last several years as a result of general secularization and especially
as a result of recent sex scandals involving Catholic clergy."8
Over the decades since adopting the 1937 Constitution, the Irish
have struggled to balance religious conviction and personal autonomy. The 1995 Divorce Referendum sought a legal remedy to address the consequences of a distressing phenomenon that the Irish
had observed for many decades, i.e., that marriages in Ireland were
no more secure from breakdown-permanent abandonment, de facto
separation, and the formation of other relationships-than were marriages in any other modem Western society. In 1985, it was estimated that seventy thousand married persons in Ireland were living
in broken marriages, as the result of desertion and other forms of
non-judicial separation. 9 From 1986 to 1991, marital-breakdown figures showed an increase of 48%.2 In 1991 alone, thirty five hundred
individuals were added to the national tally of broken marriages, according to census data.'
II. THE 1922 CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE
The Bunreacht na hireann, or the Constitution of tire
(Ireland), put in place in 1937, contained several crucial provisions
affecting the status of women and their marital station.' This document departed significantly from the preliminary Constitution of
1922, which did not mention divorce.' In order to understand the
significant extent to which the 1937 Constitution parted with Ireland's social and legal past, one must first examine the changes
wrought to the law during the years between 1922 and 1937.
17. See Tom Garvin, Democracy in Ireland: Collective Somnambulance and PublicPolicy,
39 ADMIN. 42,42 (1991).
18. See Gerard Whyte, Religion and the Irish Constitution, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 725,
728 (1997); see also infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
19. See TERRENCE BROWN, IRELAND: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY, 1922 TO THE
PRESENT 265 (1985).
20. See Mags O'Brien, The History of Divorce in Ireland, in DIVORCE?: FACING THE
ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN 7 (Mags O'Brien ed., 1995).
21. See id. The population of Ireland stands currently at approximately 3.5 million.
Hence an annual increase of broken marriages by 3,500 cases a year affects a significant portion of Irish marriages.
22. See generally IR. CONST. art. 41 (1937), reprintedin note 50 infra (regarding the state's
responsibility to uphold the sanctity of the family).
23. See CONST. OF THE IR. FREE STATE (SAORSTAT tIREANN) of 1922.
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With the Constitution of 1922, the jurisdiction over divorce mat-

ters was transferred, as were all other legal matters, from Westminster to the Irish Free State. Heated debates quickly arose in both the
Dil 4 and the Seanade over which normative standards should be applied in determining divorce law in Ireland.' During the years between the two Constitutions, bills were introduced and argued that
bolstered the anti-divorce position, which served to alienate the minority of Irish who adhered to the Church of Ireland (Anglican).' As
argued most vehemently by Senator William Butler Yeats during the
debates over the 1925 Private Members Bill that sought to strengthen
anti-divorce legislation:
I think it tragic that within three years of this country gaining its independence we should be discussing a measure which a minority of
this nation considers to be grossly oppressive. I am proud to consider myself a typical man of that minority. We against whom you
have done this thing are no petty people. We are one of the great
stocks of Europe. We are the people of Burke; we are the people
of Grattan; we are the people of Swift, the people of Emmet, the
people of Parnell. We have created the most modem literature of
this country. We have created the best of its political intelligence.2
In fact, prior to the passage of any specific legislation, citizens of
Ireland were in effect denied recourse to divorce as soon as the Irish
Free State assumed jurisdiction over family law issues. Because divorce was available in Ireland under British rule, Archbishop Byrne,
in concluding that divorce had no place in Ireland, felt safe in stating:
Hitherto, in obedience to the divine law, no divorce with right to
remarry has even been granted in this country [i.e., the newly
24. The Dil (pronounced Doyle) is the lower house of the Irish Parliament, the Oireachtas.
25. The Seanad is the upper house of the Oireachtas.

26. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 174.
27. The 1911 census revealed that 90% of Irish were adherents to the Roman Catholic
faith. This figure continued to rise in the succeeding years. See RONAN FANNING, INDEPENDENT IRELAND 53 (1983).
28. William Butler Yeats, quoted in O'Brien, supra note 20, at 9. Divorce, as Yeats pre-

dicted, has become one of the principal stumbling blocks of North/South negotiations over the
years. Protestants in Northern Ireland would never accept accession to the Republic without

some insurance that divorce would continue to be an option for them as it is in the North.
Although it may be easy to accept Yeats' contention that his views were representative
of the sentiments of all Anglo-Irish, it must be mentioned that there was a significant number
of Anglo-Irish who felt that Yeats' bellicose outpourings did not represent a typical AngloIrishman. "The general response among articulate Protestants was that Willie Yeats had made
an exhibition of himself again, his extravagant words having tended to discredit the case for
divorce by overwhelming the cagier strategies adopted by 'plainer men."' Fitzpatrick, supra

note 4, at 193.
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formed Irish Free State]. The bishops of Ireland have to say that it
would be altogether unworthy of an Irish legislative body to sanction concession of such divorce, no matter who the petitioners may
be.y
By 1925, the government expressly disregarded any divorce bills
that came before the Oireachtas.' In fact, the government considered passing legislation stating explicitly that Private Bills for divorce
would not be entertained; however, fearing that such a blatant move
in an era in which divorce was still technically a legal option would
prove too provocative, the Dil opted for a more surreptitious approach and made it known that they would suppress any Private Divorce Bills that were proposed, a tactic of questionable legality.31
W.T. Cosgrave, then Taoiseachn spoke for the general sentiments of
the members of the DAil when he stated:
The majority of people of this country regard the bond of marriage
as a sacramental bond which is incapable of being dissolved. I personally hold this view. I consider that the whole fabric of social organisation is based upon the sanctity of the marriage bond and anything that tends to weaken the binding efficacy of that bond to that
extent strikes at the roots of our social life ....
Needless to say, "no other petitioners had the temerity to wander into procedural no man's land during the last twelve years of legal divorce in the twenty-six counties" of Ireland.' 4
The years between the Constitution of 1922, a constitution which
attempted to act as a compromise constitution between the more
radical Irish independence movement and those loyal to the British
Crown, 35 and the 1937 Constitution of Ireland were thus marked by
an attempt by the Irish government to whittle away any remaining
traces of British rule and influence.6 By 1937, the core of the 1922
Constitution on matters of family law had largely been eviscerated,
29. Archbishop Byrne, Resolution passed at Maynooth College, and signed by Cardinal
Logue (Oct. 9,1923), quoted in FANNING, supranote 27, at 56.
30. See Fitzpatrick, supranote 4, at 174. The Oireachtas is the Irish Parliament.
31. See CLIFFORD,supra note 7, at 57-58.
32. The Taoiseach (pronounced tea-shuck) is the Irish Prime Minister.
33. CLIFFORD, supranote 7, at 58 (quoting Cosgrave).
34. Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 174.
35. The compromise of the 1922 Constitution that was struck by the moderates can be
seen in the inclusion of a provision for an Oath of Allegiance to the British crown, a right of
appeal to the British Privy Council, the position of Governor General and the maintenance in
Ireland of the Monarch's representative, as well as the inclusion of protection for certain liberal
democratic rights, such as the freedoms of religion, of speech, and of assembly. See Whyte, supranote 18, at 728.
36. See id.
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and Ireland was in a position to give free rein to those who wished to
create a national document based on the social world-view of the

Roman Catholic Church.'
IV. THE 1937 CONSTITUTION OF tIRE (IRELAND)
In the 1937 Constitution,s the provision forbidding divorce was a
natural consequence of the direct influence of the Roman Catholic
faith in Ireland. As a member of the Dil, Edmund Duggan remarked of his conversations with Archbishop Byrne of Dublin:
I take it that the result of the absence of facilities for divorcein this
country would be that persons desiring such facilities would leave
Ireland and become domiciled in some other country in which they
are available. The archbishop's view is that Ireland would not lose
anything by this.39
In fact, Ireland stood to lose a great deal in not providing for di-

vorce, if it were ever to realize its dream of eventual unification of
the twenty-six counties of the South with the six of the North. Article

2 of the Constitution states that "the national territory consists of the
whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas."' Although Article 3 reassuringly states that laws promulgated by Ireland
are to be effective only within the Irish Free State, and emphasizes
the fact that these laws will all be passed "pending reintegration" of

the North and South, there is no mention made of any subjection of
the basic constitutional provisions to the same divided standard. In37. It is interesting to note that just as Ireland was embarking on a new Catholic constitutional era and as a result closing off divorce as a legal option, Britain was expanding and simplifying its divorce laws. In July 1937 the Matrimonial Causes Act gave Britain (and Northern
Ireland in 1939) new grounds for divorce; in addition to the long-recognized ground of adultery, the new legislation allowed divorces on grounds of desertion, cruelty, unsoundness of
mind, rape, sodomy and bestiality. For England, see Act of 30 July 1937 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6,
ch. 57) (Eng.); for extension of the law to Scotland, see Act of 29 July 1938 (1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch.
50) (Eng.); for Northern Ireland, see Act of 4 July 1939 (2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 13) (N.Ir. Stat.).
Terrence Brown argues that the move to make divorce illegal, along with the passage of the
Censorship of Films Act of 1923 and the Censorship of Publications Act of 1929, was indicative
of the repressiveness of the Irish government and that these acts during the first crucial decades
of Ireland's independence "severely stunted the cultural and social development of a country
which a protracted colonial mismanagement had left in desperate need of revival in both
spheres." BROWN, supranote 19, at 34.
38. The 1937 Constitution is the constitution that is in force today in tire-Ireland. It will
henceforth be referred to as merely the Constitution.
39. Letter from Eamoan Duggan, Minister of Home Affairs, Irish Free State, to William
Thomas Cosgrave (Mar. 20, 1993) (on file, State Paper Office, Dublin Castle, Cabinet Papers,
S.4127), CorrespondenceRegarding Divorce in the IrishFree State (1923-29), quoted in Fitzpatrick, supranote 4, at 188.
40. IR. CONST. art. 2.
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deed, the intent is just the opposite; the Constitution expressly reserved the "fight to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that
[national] territory," even though the exercise of that right is temporarily impeded by the division of the North and South." Thus, Articles 2 and 3, while ambiguous, seem to declare that the Constitution
is to go into force for North and South alike upon reunification. For
those Anglo-Irish Protestants long accustomed to certain personal
rights, such as the right to divorce, the codification of church doctrine
into the South's Constitution was a realization of their worst fears.42
The deference accorded the Catholic Church appears incongru-

ous in a document intended theoretically to cover both the predominantly Catholic South and the predominantly Protestant North, but
acknowledgement of the Church's preeminent position was reasonable in a document intended as a practical matter to cover only the
twenty-six counties of the South. In any case, enshrining the Church
in the Constitution was essential for ecclesiastical approval, and was
at the time strongly favored by the majority of voters who would be
asked to ratify the document.

While Roman Catholicism and hence, by implication, its teachings were specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the entire
document stands behind a trinitarian Christian aegis, invoking the
41. IR. CONST. art. 3.
42. Eamon Donnelly, a Fianna Fail representative in 1937, proposed an amendment on
the floor of the Dil to postpone any referendum on the constitution until the end of partition.
Although unsuccessful, "his amendment contained a shrewd comment on the legitimacy of a
constitution which claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Ireland, but was not submitted 'to the
whole people of Ireland."' J.J. LEE, IRELAND, 1912-1985: POLmcs AND SoCIETY 206 (1989).
This concern is not of mere historical interest, since the issues go to the heart of current reunification discussions. For example, in 1984 a New Ireland Forum was established to assess the
impact of reunification and the changes that would need to be put in place in order to realize
such a goal. See id. at 675. It "embarked on a conscious search for an Irish identity that would
simultaneously embrace and transcend the conflicting identities of unionism and nationalism."
Id. In so doing, it came to the conclusion that the 1937 Constitution was unsuited to the united
Ireland that it claimed to include. See id at 676. The Forum, however, did not clarify to what
extent the Republic should go in eliminating the restrictions on divorce in its Constitution in
order to afford Northern Protestants the right to divorce that they have enjoyed in the North.
The Catholic bishops involved in the forum "took refuge in unhelpful generalities." BROWN,
supranote 19, at 265.
In 1993, the Joint Declaration by the Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and Prime Minister John
Major recognized that a reunified Ireland would have to protect the "democratic dignity and
the civil rights and religions liberties of both communities." Joint Declaration by the Taoiseach
(Irish Prime Minister) Mr. Albert Reynolds, TD, and Prime Minister John Major, MP, at 3
(London, Dec. 15, 1993) (on file with author). Although divorce was not specifically mentioned
in this general document, it was one of the crucial doctrinal issues dividing North and South at
the time.
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Holy Trinity, "from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final
end, all actions both of men and states must be referred."43 According to the Constitution, God is the preeminent source of political legitimacy, a view held by the Church since the time of St. Augustine.4'
Authorization to seek approval of the Roman Catholic Church of
proposed legislation is arguably authorized by Article 1, which states
that Ireland is to develop its laws "in accordance with its own genius
and tradition."45
Thus an explicit respect for religion lies at the heart of the Irish
legal system. Article 44.1 states that "the State acknowledges that
the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold
His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion."' ' Unsurprisingly, special status was accorded to the Roman Catholic
Church in the Constitution as first written; it was pronounced that the
"special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church"
would assist the government by being the "guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens."'47 Although this explicit
favoritism toward to the Roman Catholic Church was eliminated by
constitutional amendment in 1972, the special focus on the link of
Church and State still remains.'
One of the consequences of this union is the emphasis that the
Constitution attaches to the family;49 the Constitution stresses the
43. IR. CONST. preamble.
44. See S.I. Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do they Protect Internationally Recognized
Human Rights and Minimize the Potentialfor Violence Within a Society?, 29 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 1, 28 (1997).
45. IR. CONST. art. 1.
46. IR. CONST. art. 44.1. One example of the Church's hold on Ireland's legislative agenda
helps to illustrate the strength of the Catholic grasp. The Mother and Child Scheme of 1951, the
government's proposal for a mother and child health-care assistance program, did not comport
with Catholic dogma. The Catholic bishops' concerns over the scheme were fourfold: 1) The
right to provide for the health of one's children did not belong to the state but to the parents; 2)
the state could not give assistance to 10% of neglectful parents, because this would discriminate
against the 90% of parents who were being good Catholics and minding their duty to their
family; 3) there was no guarantee that official state doctors would respect Catholic principles of
gynecological care (although predominately Catholic, almost all physicians were educated in
British medical schools); and 4) the scheme would destroy the doctor/patient confidential relationship in its use of a state doctor. Following this determination by the Catholic hierarchy, the
government quickly changed the program to comply with the Church's social teachings. See
Eamonn McKee, Church-State Relations and the Development of Irish Health Policy: The
Mother-and-ChildScheme, 1944-53, IR. HIST. STUD., Nov. 1986, at 159,171.
47. IR. CONST. art. 44.1.2, amended by IR. CONST. amend. III. Note that article 44.1 still
remains in force.
4& See id. The Third Amendment entered into force on June 8,1972.
49. The "family" as the integral social unit does not mean the conjugal dyad-or nuclear
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centrality of the family to a well-ordered State, the primacy of the
woman as mother in maintaining familial well being, and the need to
protect her position by relieving her of the necessity for working outside the home and by assuring that marriage will remain indissoluble.' The family as one of the Constitution's central features paralfamily-as we know it, but rather means the extended family, including grandparents and siblings, under one roof, a notion that has deep roots in Irish society. A recent study of the familial patterns of Ballyduff, County Kerry during the years 1901 to 1911 indicate that the vast
majority of households were composed of extended families. See Donna Birdwell-Pheasant,
Irish Households in the Early Twentieth Century: Culture, Class, and Historical Contingency,
118 J. FAM. I-BsT. 19,32 (1993).
The constitutional definition of family also has serious ramifications for the status of
children born out of wedlock. Children not born into a "family," one constitutionally defined
as being grounded in marriage, are not considered legitimate. In The State (Nicolaou) v. An
Bord Uchtala,Justice Henchy stated that no union other than one that is grounded in marriage
will satisfy the constitutional definition of a family:
While it is quite true that unmarried persons cohabiting together and the children bf
their union may often be referred to as a family and have many, if not all, of the outward appearances of a family, and may indeed for the purposes of a particular law be
regarded as such, nevertheless so far as Art. 41 is concerned the guarantees ... are
confined to families based upon marriage.
[1966] I.L.R.M. 567 (Ir. H. Ct.), availablein LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File. The marriage
of the parents after the birth of their child, however, will suffice to constitute a marriage for
constitutional purposes:
I find it impossible to distinguish between the constitutional position of a child whose
legitimacy stems from the fact that he was born the day after his parents were married, and that of a child whose legitimacy stems from the fact that his parents were
married the day after he was born .... The crucial fact in each case is that the child's
legitimacy and consequent membership of the family are founded on the parent's
marriage.
In the matter of J., an infant, [1966] I.R. 295 (Ir. H. Ct.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library,
Cases File (opinion of Justice Henchy,).
50. Before the successful divorce referendum of 1995, Article 41 of the Irish Constitution
stated, in its entirety:
1.1' The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit
group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible
rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.
20 The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and
authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of
the Nation and the State.
2.1* In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives
to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
20 The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged
by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.
3.10 The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on
which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.
20 No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage.
30 No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other
State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within
the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this constitution
shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved.
IR. CONST. art. 41.
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lels the importance of the family in Catholic social teaching. 1

In furthering the mandate of Article 41, the courts often have attempted to strike a balance between social ideals and economic reali-

ties, for example by refusing to interpret the constitutional expectation that women will remain in the home to mean that the

Constitution forbids women to work outside the home. Although
President Robinson has commented that Ireland's restrictive constitutional language has been in some instances glossed over thanks to
the "tricky juristic knack of keeping their [constitution's] old words
and apparently antiquated phrases in constant touch with the spirit of

successive ages"52 through "formal amendment, legislative action and
imaginative judicial interpretation,"53 the courts have largely declined

to open the Pandora's box of Article 41 at all, 4
In McGee v. Attorney General,5 the Irish Supreme Court established, by reference to Article 41, a constitutional right to marital privacy, which included the right to use contraceptives, which until this

time had been illegal even for married couples. This judicially significant case has had little legislative impact and has been so downplayed by the judiciary that "one sometimes wonders whether or not
the Supreme Court actually gave judgment in this matter at all, and
whether or not there is a right of marital privacy that must be respected."5'6 But the significance of the case remains: McGee was the
51. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, para. 2207 (1995); see also id.para. 2211
(stating that the political community has a duty to the maintenance of the family).
It has been argued that the unique history of the Catholics in Ireland over the centuries has
resulted in an unusually strong bond between the family, marriage, and the Church. During the
17th and 18th centuries, Penal Laws were enacted in order to keep native Irish in line with and
in subjection to the British Crown. The Marriage Act (Ireland) of 1697 (9 Will. 3, ch. 3) (Eng.)
and the Penal Marriage Act of 1745 (19 Geo. 2, ch. 13) (Eng.) were designed to prohibit the
intermarriage of native Irish and the English. Consequently, native Irish turned to the Church
rather than to the state to provide marriage services. This trend of looking to the Church instead of the state in this regard continues to the present. See Kathleen O'Higgins, Divorce and
Remarriage in Ireland, 34 ADMIN. 164, 182 (1986). Even today, if a couple is married by a
Catholic priest, no marriage license is required; for Protestants and those adhering other faiths,
a marriage license is required. See Mags O'Brien, The Churches: The Legal Requirementsfor
Marriage in Ireland and the Differing Attitudes of Various Churches to Divorce and ReMarriage, in DIvORCE?: FACING THE ISSUES OF MARiTAL BREAKDOWN 115 (Mags O'Brien
ed., 1995).
52. Mary Robinson, Constitutional Shifts in Europe and the United States, 32 STAN. J.
INT'LL. 1, 5 (1996).
53. Id.
54. See IR. CONST. art. 41.2.2.
55. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C.), cited in James O'Reilly, Marital Privacy and the Irish Constitution,LAW & JUST., Easter 1985, at 18, 31.
56. O'Reilly, supranote 55, at 32.
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first time that the Irish courts expressly adopted a holding that ran
counter to Catholic teaching. The court, in establishing the right to
marital privacy, concluded that this included the couple's right of access to contraception devices.' In this respect, the case was a first
step, although lightly trod, on the path towards judicial freedom from
ecclesiastical constraints.
In some instances the courts would rather ignore any consideration of Article 41 that may arise in the interpretation and evaluation
of a case. For example, Article 41.2.2 proclaims that the state shall
"endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic
necessity to engage in labor to the neglect of their duties in the
home." Article 40.1 states that all persons enjoy equal legal status;
however, the article qualifies this statement by adding that "this shall
not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have
due regard to differences of capacity, both physical and moral, and of
social function." 9 Yet the assertion that women's "social function" is
in the home and that women have no place in the work force, pursuant to Article 41.2.2., is arguably quite discriminatory, and leaves
room for the contention that the Constitution in internally inconsistent.W6 No such argument has been made in a case before the Irish
Supreme Court, but it is not outside the realm of reason to anticipate
that such an argument might reasonably carry substantial constitutional weight.' Even after finding a constitutional right to marital
privacy, in no instance did the court tamper with Article 41's prohibition of divorce.
V. THE LAW OF DIVORCE IN IRELAND
A. Prior to 1986
Despite the prohibition on divorce in the 1937 Constitution, the
termination of marr.'iage was not absolutely forbidden under Irish
law, for two well-established but infrequently used principles of law
allowed for dissolution of some marriages by judicial declaration.
The first of these, referred to as a divorce a mensa et thoro (and as
distinct from a divorce a vinculo, or legal, divorce)62 could be granted
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See McGee, I.R. 284 at 289-90, cited in O'Reily, supranote 55, at 32.
IR. CONsT. art. 41.2.2.
IR. CONsT. art. 40.1.
See Strong, supra note 44, at 33-34.
See id.
See William Binchy, Divorce in Ireland: Legal and Social Perspectives, J. DIV., Fall
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if adultery, cruelty, or unnatural practices can be proven over the defenses of condonation, collusion, and recrimination.' The second
way in which a marriage may be invalidated is on the petition of nullity. A marriage will be automatically declared null and void where
either of the parties was underage, 64 consented to the marriage under
duress, was mentally incompetent, was too closely related to the
spouse, or where the couple failed to comply with the formal requirements of the marriage, such as marriage registration. A marriage may also be voidable upon a petition of nullity based on impotence.' This option links Irish judicial evaluation with Catholic
canonical teaching: the inability to consummate a marriage or an illness existing at the time of the marriage ceremony (which would impact the consummation of the marriage) is one of the primary canonical disabilities outlined in Canon 1084 of the Catholic Church.67
Even when they met the requirements for a divorce a mensa et thoro
or through the law of nullity, many couples did not seek a legal solution to their marital breakdown, because neither method conferred
the right to remarry.6
Another option available to a Roman Catholic couple seeking a
termination of their marriage was an ecclesiastical annulment, which,
like a civil one, recognizes that the marriage was invalid to begin
1978, at 99, 100. This limited form of separation was valid under section 7 of the Matrimonial
Causes (Ireland) Act of 1870.
63. See id In practice the high burden of proof needed for a divorce a mensa et thoro was
unattainable by the vast majority of couples desiring separation. See icl.

64. With the passage of the Marriages Act of 1972, the minimum age for contracting a
valid marriage was increased to sixteen years of age for either party. Previously the minimum

age for males was fourteen years and for females was twelve years. See William Binchy, New
Vistas in Irish Family Law, 15 J. FAM. L. 637,639 (1976-77).
65. See id.; see also BRIAN DOOLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS INIRELAND 130 (1984).
66. See ALAN JOSEPH SHATTER, SHATTER'S FAMILY LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
123-30 (3d ed. 1986).
67. See PAUL A. O'CONNOR, KEY ISSUES IN IRISH FAMILY LAW 64 n.119 (1988).
O'Connor quotes Canon 1084 as follows:
(1) Antecedent and perpetual impotence to have intercourse, whether on the part of
the man or the woman, which is either absolute or relative, of its very nature invalidates marriage. (2) If the impediment of impotence is doubtful, either by reason of a
doubt of law or a doubt of fact, a marriage is neither to be impeded nor is to be declared null as long as the doubt exists. (3) Sterility neither prohibits nor invalidates
marriage, with due regard for the prescription of canon 1098' [canon 1098 deals with
the effect of fraud on marriage].

Id.
68. This inaction can be seen from the fact that approximately forty-two thousand individuals in 1991 were living apart from their spouses (as a result of desertion or other separation) without having resorted to formal judicial separation proceedings. See TONY FAHEY AND
MAUREEN LYONS, MARITAL BREAKDOWN AND FAMILY LAW IN IRELAND 100 tbl.6.1 (1995).
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with, but leaves the partners free to remarry. Unfortunately, the
state did not recognize an ecclesiastical annulment as valid and required a civil termination, available only through judicial separation
under which no remarriage was possible. This complicated double
standard resulted in second marriages being recognized as valid by
the Church but regarded as bigamous by the State.69 Only in one sobering way in this matter did the Church and State agree: any children from the first marriage, whether annulled by the Church or the
State, were considered illegitimate by both Church and State.70
The use of the law of nullity to provide any reasonable basis
upon which a couple might divorce presents a conceptual problem,
since the law of nullity applies when the marriage is considered not to
have taken place, and thus by definition provides no effective mechanism to address the issue of marital breakdown of an existing valid
marriage.7' Despite this conceptual inconvenience, petitioners, albeit
not in large numbers, had increasingly employed the law of nullity in
the post-World War II period and were relatively successful in gaining judicial relief.7
Courts had also made the option of nullity more promising by
expanding the definitional scope of nullity and by refusing in some
instances to defer to Church dogma. In N (Otherwise K) v. K,' the
Supreme Court subscribed to a broad definition and fact-specific application of the concept of duress, one of the ways in which one a plea
of nullity can be upheld. The case concerned a nineteen-year-old
woman seeking to end a loveless marriage, which she asserted was
forced on her by her father, after he had learned of her pregnancy. In
the case the majority held that
[W]hile there was a presumption of validity regarding a marriage
ceremony, this could be rebutted by, inter alia, evidence of duress
negativing consent; that the concept of duress which would give rise
to a decree of nullity of marriage should not be restricted to threats
of physical harm or falsely based threats of other harmful consequences; rather, having regard to the fact that marriage constituted

the taking on of a status, the courts should examine whether the
taking of such a step involved voluntary consent and a fully free ex69. See John Coakley, Moral Consensus in a Secularising Society: The Irish Divorce Referendum of 1986, W. Ewt. POL., April 1987, at 291,291.
70. See generally Status of Children Act (1987) (helping to resolve this problem); see also
infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
71. See O'CONNOR, supra note 67, at 1.
72. See FAHEY AND LYONS, supranote 68.
73. See N (Otherwise K) v. K, [1986] I.L.R.M. 75 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
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ercise of the independent will of the parties, the test being a subjective one.7 4
In justifying a broad construction of duress in marital nullity law,
Justice Henchy (despite dissenting on the application of such a construction to this specific case) stated:
[I]n the law of contract duress will usually be recognized as negativing consent when it may be said to be such coercion as vitiates
the capacity to contract. The inherent subjectivity and flexibility in
the latter approach allows the courts a large measure of discretion
having regard to the type of contract and the particular circumstances of the case. In relation to the contract of marriage, it is to
be said that the courts, at least in this jurisdiction, have given a
more liberal scope to the doctrine of duress as a nullifying element
than would be applied in the construction of other kinds of contract. This is probably because, the dissolution of marriage being
prohibited by the Constitution, certain marriages which at no stage
were viable have been declared null on a liberal and humane interpretation of the doctrine of duress in relation to the contract of
marriage.75
The role of canon law in these judicial determinations under the
law of nullity has waned in recent decades. Again in N (Otherwise K)
v. K, Chief Justice Finlay stressed that even through a party may have
been granted a decree of nullity by an ecclesiastical court of the
Catholic Church, this action was not a factor that the civil court was
at liberty to consider.76
N (Otherwise K) v. K is a pivotal case which highlights the increased role of the judiciary in making the best of the constitutional
prohibition on divorce and the judiciary's concluding cases based on
its own and not canonical precedent.' It stressed the need for "'a
fully free exercise of the independent will of the parties.' ' 78 An expanded scope of what constitutes duress in the marital setting was
thus one of the ways in which79the Irish courts mitigated the harshness
of the prohibition on divorce.

74. Id. at 76.
75. Id. at 85.
76. See id. at 81.
77. See O'CONNOR, supranote 67, at 55.
78. William Duncan, Ireland. Waiting for Divorce, 25 J. FAM. L. 155, 159 (1986-87)
(quoting N (Otherwise K) v. N).
79. Using the laws of nullity to invalidate a marriage does not render unnecessary any divorce laws, since nullity is an imprecise and inapplicable standard by which to adjudicate all
divorce claims. Given the express constitutional prohibition on divorce, nullity can in no way
serve as a substitute for divorce legislation, which, according to the Constitution, must be enacted through a constitutional amendment allowing for such legislation and which must be pre-
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B. The 1986 Divorce Referendum
The expansion of the civil annulment remedy in cases such as N
(Otherwise K) v. K spurred the courts to broaden the range of annulment arguments. Beginning in the early 1980s, the High Court
began to interpret illnesses, such as manic depression and other psychological illnesses, as "incapacities" to the consummation of a marriage and therefore sufficient cause to justify an annulment. While
broadly within the canonical teachings of the Catholic Church," this
judicial interpretation stretched church dogma thin. In D v. C, the
court found that a medically recognized psychological illness provided adequate grounds for the granting of a judicial separation.81 In
W v. P, moreover, the court found that merely a psychological or
emotional disability or incapacity was sufficient to warrant an annulment.' In keeping with this low threshold for meeting the requirement for an annulment, the court concluded that basic emotional
immaturity satisfied the incapacity test.8
In other areas as well, the courts decided not merely to stretch
Catholic teaching to make it fit newer social mores, but to disregard
the Church's opinions on some matters altogether. In recent cases,
the judiciary has been increasingly unlikely to bring in evidence of
church teaching as dispositive of a matter or even suggestive of an essential line of inquiry." In T.F. v. Ireland, a 1995 judicial separation
case, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court's ruling that barred
expert theological testimony on the essential elements of a Christian
marriage.'
Outside of the courtroom, the public and politicians were contemplating the extent to which the constitutional prohibition on disented to the citizenry through public referendum. See IR. CONST. art. 47.1.
80. See supra text accompanying note 75.
81. See D v. C, [1984] I.L.R.M. 173, availablein LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.

82. See Wv. P (Ir. H. Ct., Unreported), Jun. 7, 1984, quoted in O'CONNOR, supra note 67,
at 40-42.
83. See id. at 42.
84. See Whyte, supra note 18, at 738.
85. T.F. v. Ireland, [1995] I.L.R.M. 321 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Ireind Library,

Cases File. Whyte, supra note 18, discuses other instances in which the Irish courts have displayed a trend of downplaying natural law principles. In the now infamous case of Attorney
General v. X, the Supreme Court held that abortions could be legally performed in Ireland under certain narrow conditions. See [1992] 1 I.R. 1, available in LEXIS, Ireind Library, Cases

File; see also infra notes 127-45 and accompanying text. In A Ward of the Court, the Supreme
Court authorized nourishment support to be stopped for a patient who had been in a vegetative
state for over twenty years. See [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. S.C.), cited by Whyte, supra note 18,
at 738.
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vorce could be modified, broadened, or even eliminated.

Many

members of Parliament attempted to introduce legislation to repeal
the constitutional ban." Public opinion polls had indicated through-

out the mid-1980s that the Irish public was willing to consider voting
for the implementation of divorce legislation. With a moderate margin in the polls of over 61% in favor of divorce, Taoiseach Garrett
Fitzgerald's government (a coalition between the Fine Gael and Labour parties) proposed a constitutional amendment bill in 1986 that
would allow divorce legislation.' A referendum in support of such an
amendment was submitted to the electorate for public vote on June

26, 1986; despite polls showing support, 63.5% of those voting
(approx. 60.8% of those eligible) opposed the measure.' The large
anti-divorce turnout, and the decision of many pro-divorce voters to
switch their votes at the last minute, was largely the result of heated
campaigning by the Roman Catholic Church and other traditionalist
organizations against divorce.'s
86. In 1980, Dr. Noel Browne introduced the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill;
in February 1983 and in May 1985, Proinsais de Rossa, Teachta Ddla (member of the Diil, or
T.D.) of the Worker's Party introduced proposed amendment bills; in November 1985 a backbencher proposed the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill; and Mr. Taylor, T.D. for Labour introduced the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution (No. 2) Bill, also in November
1985. See Duncan,Ireland. Waitingfor Divorce, supranote 77, at nn.3-5 & 7.
The government studied the problem of marital breakdown and issued its findings in a report,
entitled MaritalBreakdown: A Review and Proposed Changes that contained a number of different solutions to the issue of marital breakdown. See JOINT COMMrrrEE ON MARRIAGE
BREAKDOWN, MARrrAL BREAKDOWN: A REVIEW AND PROPOSED CHANGES, P1. 3074 (1985).

87. For a comprehensive evaluation of the 1986 Divorce Referendum, see generally
MICHELE DILLON, DEBATING DIVORCE (1993).
88. See T. O'Mahony, Ireland'sDivorce Referendum, AMERICA, Jul. 26, 1986, at 23; Joseph Lee, Dynamics of Social and Political Change in the Irish Republic, in NORTHERN
IRELAND AND THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION 127 (Dermot Keogh and Michael H. Haltzel
eds., 1993).
89. Anti-divorce campaigners were able to create uncertainty in the minds of many voters,
especially women and the urban electorate, by raising related issues not dealt with in the government proposal, such as alimony and inheritance. See R. Darcy and Michael Laver, Referendum Dynamics and the Irish Divorce Amendment, PUB. OPIN. Q., Spring 1990, at 1, 13. As the
campaign became increasingly bitter during its last days, the political elites who had previously
supported the promulgation of divorce law withdrew from the debate in order to save face; with
their withdrawal, the campaign lost some its political legitimacy. See id. at 16-17.
Some of the private organizations such as Family Solidarity (a group formed to combat the prodivorce forces at the 1986 Referendum) sponsored particularly well-organized campaigns.
Family Solidarity held as its motto, "the family is the true measure of the greatness of the nation." The Chairman of the organization stated, "We are totally and utterly opposed to divorce
because it is the ultimate and most deadly attack on the family." In response to a proposal allowing unmarried people access to contraceptives, the Chairman retorted, "Family planning for
people who are not forming a family is merely a licence to fornicate and we think this is a
threat to the family...." BEALE, supranote 2, at 16-17.
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Opponents based their arguments both on the Church's belief
that marriage is indissoluble and on secular opinions that divorce eats
away at the foundation of the marital system; the availability of divorce was thought to grease a slope down which couples in unsteady
marriages could slide, encouraging even more divorces; to victimize
women economically; to cause children needless economical and psychological suffering; and to leave families of subsequent marriages
unusually troubled? Proponents of divorce maintained that the
family system in Ireland was becoming more pluralistic; that the introduction of divorce in Ireland would not entail the social reorganization of the nation; that a prohibition on divorce is not a safeguard
against marital breakdown; that the institution of divorce would not
merely legalize a prevalent situation of couples in broken marriages
living apart and often involved in second relationships, but would instead give them the freedom to remarry; and that the bulk of the psychological troubles suffered by children from divorced parents actually occurs prior to the divorce. 1
The Catholic Church was obviously deeply involved in the debates. In its publication What God Has Joined, the Irish Theological
Commission argued that marriage is part of God's design and that,
regardless of an individual's religious beliefs, the Church has an obligation to monitor and uphold the accepted and time-tested values of
family life.' The Catholic Church stressed that it trusted its adherents to vote according to their consciences,' while conveying its opposition through messages at mass across the country during the
weeks of the campaign. 4
Compared to the well-oiled lobbying machinery of those who fought against divorce, the pro-

divorce campaign was comparatively small, poor, and ultimately unsuccessful. See Evelyn Mahon, Women's Rights and Catholicism in Ireland, NEW LEFr REV., Nov./Dec. 1987, at 53, 67.
The main organization for divorce, the Divorce Action Group, led by feminist and Labour
Party member Jean Tansey, found support in some high profile feminists, including Mary Maher of the Irish Times and Mary Kenny of the Irish Press, journalists who had exposed the

plight of deserted housewives and criticized the legal preclusion to their remarriage. See id. at
58.
90. See Kathleen O'Higgins, Divorce and Remarriagein Ireland: An Examination of the
Main Issues and Arguments Forand Against, 34 ADMIN. 164, 178 (1986).

91.
92.
93.
94.

See generally id. at 178-92.
See id. at 170.
See Lee, Dynamics of Social and PoliticalChange,supranote 88, at 127.
The Catholic Church launched a "full-scale offensive. For weeks Sunday sermons

were given on the family and on the evils of divorce, and extensive literature was delivered to
every home in Ireland at enormous cost. Archbishop McNamara of Dublin compared the in-

troduction of divorce with the aftermath of the then topical Chernobyl disaster." Mahon, supra
note 89, at 67.
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The referendum's defeat compelled the legislature to devise alternate methods of addressing the inconsistencies and injustices
wrought by the strict prohibition on divorce. Public opinion polls
taken immediately after the referendum showed results consistent
with pre-referendum percentages; a substantial majority of the public
was still in favor of divorce, at least in principle.95 Some politicians
were concerned about the negative message sent to the Northern
Irish by the outcome of the divorce referendum, particularly since it
came on the heels of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, which gave
the Republic a consultative role in the affairs of Northern Ireland.96
Barry Desmond, Labour minister for Health, argued that the issue of
Northern Ireland was extremely relevant to the divorce proposal:
Few are naive enough to believe that the introduction of divorce in
the Republic would persuade the Unionists to look with more favour on their Catholic neighbours. However, in the proposed referendum we cannot ignore the implications of a decision to maintain the constitutional prohibition on divorce for our aspiration to
bring peace and stability to this island. A "no" vote will reaffirm
the traditional view of southern society that one moral principle of
one Church, the indissolubility of marriage, is more important that
the moral principle of fundamental respect for the rights of others;
a "yes" vote will, on the other hand, be a vote in favour of a new
Ireland with which all traditions might identify. 97
The defeat of the proposed divorce amendment in 1986 was due
in great part to the inefficiency and shortsightedness of its proponents. Many of the essential provisions concerning pension, benefit,
and inheritance rights of the newly separated spouses were not
worked out until the very eve of the Referendum; such issues as
whether a divorced wife who had never worked could assert any right
to a portion of her working husband's pension had not been worked
out." Government proponents of divorce reform could only offer
95. See Lee, Dynamics of Social and Political Change, supra note 88, at 127. Of those
polled in February 1986,77% were willing to allow divorce under certain circumstances. In October 1986, following the referendum, 70% remained willing to permit divorce under certain
circumstances. Similarly, in February 1986, 52% of those polled were in favor of a complete
removal of the constitutional ban on divorce. By October 1986, following the defeat of the bill,
51% of those polled still were in favor of the removal of the divorce ban. "Attitudes toward
divorce were not changed during the campaign, only attitudes toward the government's divorce
amendment." Darcy and Laver, supra note 89, at 4.

96. See Coakley, supra note 69, at 291-92. The defeat of the divorce amendment signaled
to the North that the Republic remained staunchly priest-ridden and backward. LId. at 295.
97. 366 DAm DEB. col. 1323 (May 15,1986), quoted in DILLON, DEBATING DIVORCE, su-

pranote 86, at 65.
98. See Mahon, supra note 89, at 68. Many of the unresolved issues of economic support
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"vague promises that their legislation, when eventually finalised,

would deal with the issues raised by objectors."
C. Developments in the Wake of the 1986 Referendum on Divorce
In the years following the defeat of the referendum, the Irish
legislature enacted significant pieces of legislation intended to soften
the edges of the divorce prohibition and to ease Ireland into an era in
which divorce legislation might be a more realistic prospect.
Through the enactment of the 1987 Status of Children Act, the legislature helped to ameliorate the harsh consequences (such as the legal

incapacity to inherit) to children rendered illegitimate as the result of
their parents being granted a judicial separation."° This legislation
changed the legal status of children born out of wedlock by minimizing the legal consequences of illegitimacy and granting to those children born outside of a marriage the same rights and guarantees of inheritance and maintenance of a minimum standard of living given to
those born within a marriage.'0 '
of spouses and children were addressed in other legislation passed subsequent to the 1986 referendum. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
99. Patrick Riordan, Creating Space for Debate: The Catholic Church's Contribution, in
DIVORCE?: FACING THE ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN at 123,129-30, supra note 20. Wiliam Binchy, author of Is DIVORCE THE ANSWER? AN EXAMINATION OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE IRISH DEBATE (1984), and one of the long-time scholars
sympathetic to the possibility of divorce legislation in Ireland, chose to side in this referendum
with the anti-divorce cause and became the legal spokesman for the anti-divorce organization,
Family Solidarity. See Mahon, supranote 89, at 67.
100. As explained in a 1992 government review of divorce:
In the area of succession rights, the former position was that a child of parents not
married to each other had limited rights to succeed on the death of its mother where
she had not made a will and no rights at all on the death of its father or anyone related
through him where the father had not made a will. As regards wills, there was a rule
of interpretation the effect of which was that a reference to family relationship excluded any links to or through an illegitimate relation unless the contrary intention
appeared. Since the coming into effect of the [Status of Children] Act, distribution of
an estate where there is no will is now carried out without distinction based on the
marital status of any relative's parents; and wills and other instruments made since
then are interpreted on the basis that references to family relationships are to be construed, unless the instrument otherwise provides, without regard to whether any person's parents have married each other. The provision of the Succession Act, 1965section 177-which enables a child of a person who died having made a will to apply
to court for proper provision out of the estate, where such provision has not been
made, applies to all children of a deceased who died after the coming into effect of the
Act, whether or not the deceased had married the child's other parent.
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, MARITAL BREAKDOWN: A REVIEW AND PROPOSED CHANGES, PI.
9104 (1992), § 7.11, at 51. Note that in 1985 the Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown issued
a report with the identical title. See supranote 86.
101. See Dervla Browne, Legal Changes in the Law Covering Marital Breakdown, in
DIVORCE?: FACING THE ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN 55,65, supranote 20; see also Mags
O'Brien, et al., Separating and Coping Alone or in a Second Relationship, in DIVORCE?:
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In 1989, the legislature passed the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, which provided a more expansive procedure for
judicial separation than did the Matrimonial Causes (Ireland) Act of
1870. Instead of having to prove adultery, cruelty and/or unnatural
practices in order to obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro,07 under the
1989 Act grounds for judicial separation include adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, separation with consent for one year, separation without consent for three years, and irrevocable marital
breakdown for a minimum of one year preceding the date of application for separation."n The lack of clear tests by which courts were to
determine whether couples have met one of these six prerequisites
for judicial separation proved troublesome. The sixth option was
vulnerable to broad interpretation; for it allowed a separation if the
court found that a "normal marital relationship had not existed between the spouses" for at least one year gave courts a power approaching a no-fault separation option.1 4
7 it was argued that
In F v. F, Ireland and the Attorney General,"
the provision of the 1989 Act allowing a judicial separation when one
of the spouses did not consent was unconstitutional, for the resulting
separation order impinged on the non-consenting spouse's rights to
both property and family life. The High Court, however, held that
these rights were not impinged upon, since the legislature had given
the judiciary the mandate to separate couples whose marriages had
met the threshold requirements for separation."'
Another key component of the 1989 Act was the provision for
the first time that lump sum payment orders can be made and that
maintenance orders (orders for financial support analogous to alimony in the United States) can be secured on any assets or property
owned by a spouse."
FACING THE ISSUES OFMARITALBREAKDOWN 131,142-43, supranote 20.

102. See supranotes 62-63 and accompanying text.
103. See Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, § 2(1) (1989), in MURIELWALLS
AND DAVID BERGIN, THE LAW OF DIVORCE IN IRELAND 3 (1997).

104. See Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, § 2(1)(f) (1989).
105. See F v. F, Ireland and the Attorney General, High Court (Ir. H. Ct., Unreported), Jul.
28, 1994, cited in Browne, supranote 101, at 63.

106. See id. It was further contended that an exclusion order resulting from the separation
denied the non-consenting spouse his enjoyment of property; the High Court held that the ex-

clusion order did not in fact impinge the non-consenting spouse's rights of property. See id.
This second contention was submitted to the Supreme Court for review, and resulted in the

Court's denying the petitioner her exclusionary order on procedural grounds. F v. F (Supreme
Court, Unreported), Nov. 30,1995, cited in WALLS AND BERGIN, supranote 103, at 37-38.

107. See PETER WARD, DIVORCE: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE COST? 23 (1993).
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The principal drawback of the 1989 Act was the discretionary
latitude accorded to the judiciary; couples before judges unsympathetic to divorce had little recourse. Certainly the lack of specific
guidelines for the evaluation of each prerequisite listed in section 2 of
the Act contributed to this problem."° Compounding the administrative difficulties of arriving at consistent judgements was the fact that
the bulk of these cases were heard by the Circuit court, whose opinions are rarely published and do not establish legal precedent."°
1. Recognition of Foreign Divorces. The constitutional
prohibition on divorce was relatively clear: only those marriages
terminated by divorce a mensa et thoro or under nullity law were
considered judicially dissolved."' The status in Ireland of divorces
obtained in another country, however, is not so clearly assessed from
a reading of the Constitution. From 1937 until 1986, the law stated
that a foreign divorce decree was to be recognized as valid in Ireland
only if both husband and wife were domiciliaries of the country in
which the divorce was granted."' Any other reading would run
counter to Article 41.3.3 which states that one spouse cannot
establish his or her domicile elsewhere, obtain a divorce, and then
enter into another marriage until the death of the spouse from whom
the foreign divorce was obtained."' Since at common law the wife's
domicile was considered that of her husband's, Article 41.3.3
affected, in practice, only a wife's rights: a husband could move to
another country and validly divorce his wife in the new country, since
the wife's domicile fictionally travelled with him; a wife, on the other
hand, could not do the same, since her domicile remained with her
husband's."
The Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act of 1986
did much to alleviate the unjust double standard of domicile in this
regard by stating that the domicile of either spouse will suffice to establish domicile sufficient for the granting of a foreign divorce.'
108. For a discussion of the ramifications of this judicial breadth, see Anna Margaret
McDonough, When Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling-LegalizingDivorce in Ireland, 14 DICK. J.INT'L

L. 647,654-56 (1996).
109. Browne, supranote 101, at 62. See Appendix, infra, for a description of the Irish court
system.
110. See supranotes 63-72 and accompanying text.
111. See WAus AND BERGIN, supranote 103, at 216.

112. IR. CONST. art. 41.3.3.
113. See McDonough, supranote 108, at 650.
114. Section 5(1) of the Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act states: "[f]or
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This change, however, was limited only to either spouse's establish-

ment of domicile in the restricted jurisdictions of England, Wales,
Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands.1 5 An-

other piece of legislation, the Family Law Act of 1986, Part II, provided a jurisdictional basis for divorce recognition of other transnational divorces. Overseas divorces which are obtained by means of
proceedings, judicial or otherwise, are held to be valid if one of the

spouses is a domiciliary in the country in which this proceeding took
place."6
In the midst of the debates leading to the Domicile and Recogni-

tion of Foreign Divorces Act and the 1986 Divorce Referendum debates, a seminal case dealing with the rights of foreign divorcees to

remarry was heard before the European Court of Human Rights and
brought the issues involved to public attention. In Johnston v. Ireland,"' Roy Johnston, having been legally separated from his wife for
many years desired to remarry. He petitioned the court, arguing that
his rights under Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on

Human Rights' 9 were being infringed by the prohibition on divorce
the rule of law that a divorce is recognised if granted in a country where both spouses are
domiciled, there is hereby substituted a rule that a divorce shall be recognized if granted in the
country where either spouse is domiciled." Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces
Act, § 5(1) (1986). The constitutionality of the former common law had in fact been questioned in several cases brought before the Irish courts. See Gaffney v. Gaffney, [1975] I.R. 133
(Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File; K.D. v. M.C., [1985] I.R. 675 (Ir.
S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File. In C.M. v. T.M., Justice Barr took the
opportunity to state that the common law doctrine requiring both spouses to be domiciled in
the country granting the divorce was no longer a valid doctrine. See C.M. v. T.M. [1990] 2 I.R.
52 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File; see also Sharon Turner, Private
InternationalLaw-The Recognition of Foreign Divorces and the Demise of Legal Feudalism,
"11 DuBLIN UNIv. L. J., 180, 180 (1989).

115. See Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act, § 5(3) (1986).
116. Family Law Act of 1986, discussed and quoted in Alan Reed, Conflict of Laws: Nonrecognition of TransnationalDivorces,IR. L. TIMES, Nov. 1995, at 265, 266.
117. For a general discussion on the way in which the European Court of Human Rights
addresses family life cases, see Courtney R. Howell, The Right to Respect for Family Life in the
European Courtof Human Rights, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 693 (1995-96).
118. 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). Roy Johnston, an Irishman, had been granted a judicial separation from his wife and three children; after several years, he met Janice WilliamsJohnston. Following a relationship of seven years, they had a daughter, Nessa. The couple
wished to many, but were precluded from doing so by the fact that he could not obtain a valid
divorce in Ireland. For a discussion of the case, see John Andrews and Ann Sherlock, European Court of Human Rights, Family Life and the ConstitutionalBan on Divorce in Ireland:
Case of Johnston and Others, EUR. L. REV., Oct. 1987, at 393; Louis McRedmond, Divorce:
The Irish Constitution and the European Convention, LAw & JUST., Easter 1985, at 14.

119. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence ....There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exer-
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in the Irish Constitution. Because he was unable to obtain a divorce
from his wife who remained in Ireland, his child with his subsequent
partner was legally illegitimate and suffered the social stigmatization
accompanying this status. The court found that the Johnstons' second union and their child satisfied the definition of a family and
hence found Article 8 applicable to them, despite the fact that they
were not married.'m However, the court declined to find that this necessitated a finding of a right to divorce for Mr. Johnston within Article 8, because the more specific guidance of Article 12 controlled."'
The court also held that Ireland was not upholding the institution of
the family as it purported to in its Constitution since it allowed children to be stigmatized by illegitimacy and deprived them of familial
rights.m The court held that the Article 8 rights of Mr. Johnston, his
new partner, and their child were violated and that the best relief was
to allow divorce.'
Following this landmark case, the Irish government did attempt
to modify and eliminate the most egregious aspects of the legal status
of children born outside of marriage by passage of the Status of Children Act of 1987, in which the consequences of illegitimacy were
minimized and children born outside of marriage were given inheritance rights.' 4 The Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces
Act of 1986 also now affords subsequent "Mr. Johnstons" with a
remedy for divorces sought in approved jurisdictions."z
2. Abortion: Ireland's Other Moral Debate. Johnston, 6
appealing as it did beyond the boundaries of Ireland and Irish law,
cise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime; for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 8,213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 12 of the European Convention of Human Rights reads,
in its entirety: "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right." Id. art. 12.
120. Kathleen M. Dillon, Divorce and Remarriageas Human Rights: The Irish Constitution
and the European Convention on Human Rights at Odds in "Johnstonv. Ireland", 22 CORNELL

INT'L L. J. 63, 87 (1989).
121. See id.
122. See 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) paras. 42,46, and 65, discussed in Dillon, Divorce
and Remarriage,supranote 120, at 84.

123. See 112 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) (1986) para. 75, cited in Dillon, Divorce andRemarriage,
supra note 120, at 84.

124. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
125. See supranote 114 and accompanying text.
126. See Johnston v. Ireland,supranote 118.
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resonates with other prominent cases dealing with Ireland's other
major moral dilemma-abortion. Ireland's membership in the
European Union has compelled reconsideration of national social
policy and the extent to which it ought to be subjugated to

transnational European law.1' The implications of Irish membership
in the EU for family law is highlighted by the legal treatment of

abortion. Several high-profile and controversial abortion cases,
Society for the Protectionof Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (S.P. U C.)
v. Grogan,' Attorney General v. X, 29 and Attorney General (ex rel.
Society for the Protectionof the Unborn Child (Ireland)Ltd.) v. Open
Door Counselling Ltd.' illustrate the degree to which Irish citizens

are coming to rely on European judicial instruments to accomplish
their social aims.

In S.P.U.C. v. Grogan, the court addressed the question of
whether a student organization could provide names, addresses, and
phone numbers of organizations abroad that provided abortion services without its running afoul of the constitutional provision, Article
40.3.3, which protects the life of the unborn.

The students argued

that, under the Treaty of Rome, Irish citizens, as EU citizens, had the
right "to travel abroad to avail of services lawfully available in any
other member states of the European Community and that there was
a collateral right to receive information in relation to such serv-

127. In 1973, Ireland joined the European Community (now the European Union) and, by
doing so, pledged to uphold the laws of the Community even where they were to take precedence over national law. Ireland amended its Constitution (by public referendum, as mandated
by the Constitution) to state: "no provision of this constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts
done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the
Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Community, or
institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State." IR. CONST. art. 29.4.5 (amended
January 5, 1973).
128. See S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.), affd in part,rev'd in
part,[1989] I.R. 760 (Ir. S.C.), availablein LEXIS, Irend Library, Cases File.
129. See Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Ireind Library, Cases File.
130. See S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, [1988] I.R. 618 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
131. See Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.), availablein LEXIS, Ireind Library, Cases File.
Article 40.3.3 states "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." IR. CoNST. art. 40.3.3. Article
40.3.3 has been subsequently amended twice. In 1983 the Eighth Amendment added the following sentence: "This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state." Id See note 138 and accompanying text, infra, for a description of the second
addition to this subsection.
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ices. ' ' The High Court deferred the decision and asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to answer whether "medical termination
of pregnancy, performed in accordance with the law of the state in
which it is carried out, constituted a service within the meaning of
Article 60 of the EEC Treaty."1 33 In addition, the court asked the
ECJ to determine whether
it was contrary to Community law for a member state, in which
medical termination of pregnancy is forbidden, to prohibit persons
from distributing information about the identity and location of
clinics in another member state where voluntary termination of
pregnancy is lawfully carried out, and the means of communicating
with those clinics, particularly where the clinics in question have no
involvement in the distribution of the said information.134
While the ECJ was entertaining the case, the S.P.U.C. appealed
to the Irish Supreme Court, which reversed the High Court's interlocutory order pending the conclusion of the ECJ case and indicated
that it would have the final say on the case:
Any answer to the reference received from the Court of Justice of
the European Communities will have to be considered in the light
of our own constitutional provisions. In the last analysis only this
Court can decide finally what are the effects of the interaction of
the eighth amendment of the Constitution [giving a right to life of
the unborn, Article 40.3.3] and the third amendment of the Constitution [governing Ireland's relationship with the European Union
and stating that all laws, acts or measures adopted by the EU have
the force of law in Ireland, Article 29.4.3]. 35
The ECJ rendered an opinion that allowed the court to skirt the
most controversial of issues, holding that abortion was in fact a service protected by the Treaty of Rome, but that the Irish students
lacked standing to bring the case since they did not have an economic
relationship with the English abortion services providers. 36
Although the defendants in the Grogan case are still seeking redress,' the significance of Grogan has largely been obviated in light
132. See Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.), available in LEXIS, Ireind Library, Cases File.
133. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (S.P.U.C.) (Ireland) Ltd. v. Stephen
Grogan and Others, [1992] I.L.R.M. 461, availablein LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
134. Id.

135. S.P.U.C. v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. (Ir. S.C.) 760, 768-69, cited in David Cole, "Going to
England": Irish Abortion Law and the European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 113, 127 (1993).
136. See Cole, supranote 135, at 127.
137. See S.P.U.L. [sic] v. Grogan and Others, (Ir. S.C.) Hearing, 317/92, Mar. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File (unanimously agreeing that the changes in the law
now allowed the defendants to appeal the prior Supreme Court injunction).
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of the subsequent passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution" s and the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the
State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act of 1995.39 Nevertheless,

the broader significance lies in the fact that through the Grogan case
Irish citizens sought to gain outside legal justification for their actions
through the instrumentality of the European Union.
In a related case, S.P.U.C. v. Open Door Counselling, the distribution of abortion information was again found to be unconstitutional."4 The case was based on a fact pattern similar to Grogan, the
publication in Ireland of England-based abortion service information,
in which the salient difference was that the information was distributed to a single party during private consultation rather than wholesale to a university population. Open Door Counselling pursued the
matter in the European Court for Human Rights; the court held that
the broad injunction against access to information was unnecessary in
a democratic society to protect the morals of its citizens and concluded that the injunction was invalid.141 The court argued that, even
though member states' laws involving morals are to be given broad
deference, it found that this deference is not absolute. Since the restriction on information forced women seeking abortions to obtain
less reliable information about medical procedures, the injunction did
not serve its purpose of protecting the unborn as much as it undermined the ability of women to procure safe sources of medical information. The injunction also restricted the free exchange of information across member states. In short, Ireland's injunction could not
stand.142
One of the most significant cases causing the Irish to consider
the shortcomings of their legal system in dealing with family law was
the case in 1992 of X, 43 which dealt with the inability of a fourteen138. The Fourteenth Amendment, which amended the Constitution on December 23, 1992,

appended the following provision to Art. 40.3.3: "[t]his subsection shall not limit freedom to
obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such condition as may be laid down by law,
information relating to services lawfully available in another state." IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3,
amended by IPt. CONST. amend. XIV.

139. See Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, No. 5 (1995).
140. See S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, [1988] I.R. 618 (Ir. S.C.), avail-

able in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
141. See Open Door v. Ireland, 246-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992), cited in Cole, supra
note 135, at 137.
142. See id.
143. See Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
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year-old rape victim to receive an abortion in England, despite the
fact that she was suicidal. The Supreme Court of Ireland, although
initially prohibiting her from travelling to England for the abortion
and insisting that Ireland retained the right to violate EC law when it
impinged on what Ireland considered a moral right, reversed itself after widespread Irish and international outcry.'" Moreover, the Court,
ignoring the international implications of the case, "decided the case
as if X were seeking an abortion within Ireland. It held that abortion
is permissible where there is a real and substantial threat to the life of
the mother that can be avoided only through abortion."'' This decision, considered rash by some pro-life proponents, represents a drastic departure from traditional Irish family law and indicates the degree to which the pressures of the citizenry influenced what
amounted to the court's change of heart.
These abortion cases reveal a growing willingness on the part of
the Irish to pursue legal battles in the international arena, even when
they affect those moral rights that many Irish hold as uniquely Irish.
As some commentators have observed, the fact that Ireland is an island community and one marked by massive emigration has forced
the country to look beyond its shores for inspiration and for validation."' The Irish are increasingly becoming aware of their role in the
European community as well:
We can't go on forever declaring ourselves a nation apart when
anything goes right, and a victim of external influences when anything goes wrong. We do have some significant say in our future:
and we are responsible for making our voice heard. Too easily we
forget that the European Community has a democratic parliament
with representatives elected by us. If we don't like the way things
are going, we elect somebody else to speak on our behalf.47
With regard to divorce, there have not been any cases of import
that have come before European courts, largely because of the continued liberalization of the judicial separation mechanism and other
related laws.' There has also been a correspondingly growing consensus within Ireland that marital breakdown is just a fact of life and
that no set of laws will ever help to insure that it will never occur.
The realization that the divorce prohibition was becoming increasingly obsolete as an attempt to safeguard the family prompted many
144. See id., cited in Cole, supra note 135, at 131.
145. Id.
at 133.
146. See KEARNEY, supranote 3, at 21.

147. Id. at 11.
148. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
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Irish to rethink its usefulness, and prompted many legislators to devise methods of alleviating some of the hardship that the prohibition
if not to work for the elimination of the provision altoengenders,
149
gether.
D. The Renewed Push for Divorce
In 1992, the government, in its White Paper entitled Marital
Breakdown: A Review and Proposed Changes,"' addressed a number
of possible solutions to the divorce problem: regularizing governmental oversight of maintenance cases, strengthening the adjudication
and monitoring of domestic and EU maintenance decrees, passing
legislation ensuring each spouse a part of the proceeds from the ownership of the marital home, reexamining the scope of nullity law,
granting domestic courts the ability to determine maintenance and
other financial questions from spouses who have been granted foreign divorces and separation decrees, expanding the family court system, investigating the possibility of increased mediation options, and
finally, as the piece de resistance, proceeding with another divorce
The government proposed a non-exhaustive list of
referendum.'
five alternate constructions of divorce legislation, ranging from the
straightforward delegation of rulemaking authority on divorce to the
Oireachtas to the more complex enumeration of a series of grounds,
including separation for a number of specified years.'52 The government conceded in its recommendations that the specifics of the resulting legislation depended on the exact wording of a constitutional
amendment granting divorce, but recommended that the structure of
the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act of 1989 be used
as a guide.' No discussion of the specifics of pension benefits and no
proposals to alter the social welfare laws to meet the needs of divorcees and children from divorces were incorporated into the White
Paper; presumably, the government felt that these issues were best
The White Paper did acleft to the discretion of the legislature.'
149. See Peter Ward, Second Time Around, IR. L. TIMES, Nov. 1995, at 274, 275; see also

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, supranote 99, at 9.
150. See MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, supranote 100.
151. See id.at 13-15.
152. See id. at 89-95. The five options that the government proposed are contained in
Chapter 11 of the White Paper, entitled "Divorce: Possible Approaches to a Constitutional
Amendment." See id. For a practitioner's analysis of the White Paper's recommendations, see

Peter Ward, The Pathto Divorce?, IR. L. TIMES, Feb. 1994, at 29.
153. See MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 89-95.
154. See Ward, supranote 152, at 30.
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knowledge as an aside, however, that maintenance levels for wives
who have been judicially separated from their husbands was an issue
of much contentious debate and should be reexamined in light of a
successful divorce referendum.155 The White Paper also recommended expanding the judicial mandate of the Circuit court by allowing it to grant nullity decrees, a function heretofore restricted to
the High Court.'6
The Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act of 1986,
the Status of Children Act of 1987, and the Judicial Separation and
Family Law Reform Act of 1989 helped pave the way for the eventual and simplified passage of divorce legislation; in a similar fashion
the Matrimonial Home Bill of 1993 was shepherded through passage
in the hopes of easing the transition into an era of divorce law for
Ireland. The Matrimonial Home Bill proposed that in cases of matrimonial breakdown and resulting judicial separation, the spouses
should be considered as joint tenants of the matrimonial home and
that the house and personal property should therefore be divided
equally between them."z Unfortunately for the divorce reformers,
the Matrimonial Home Bill was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, as it was said to confer on the State a disproportionate
amount of control and intervention into the rights of the family, i.e.
those rights that are to be so carefully guarded by the State pursuant
to Article 41 of the Constitution."
It is ironic that the Matrimonial Home Bill was passed in part to
limit the range of the injustices that could be exacted under Article
41. In a revealing case, L v. L, 59 a Catholic man had married a Ger155. See MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 42.

156. See Appendix, infra, for a description of the jurisdiction of the various Irish Courts regarding family matters.
157. The Matrimonial Home Bill (1993), cited in Peter Ward, The Supreme Court Finds
MatrimonialHome Bill 1993 Unconstitutional,IR. L. TIMES, Mar. 1994, at 62, 63.

158. See In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of The Matrimonial Home Bill, 1993 (S.C. No. 367 of 1993), [1994] 1 I.R. 305 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS,
Irelnd Library, Cases File. This case was brought before the Supreme Court by President Mary

Robinson under her power to refer pieces of legislation already passed by both houses of the
Oireachtas but not yet promulgated and of questionable constitutionality to the court for review. See IR. CONST. art. 26.1.1.

Section 4 of the Matrimonial Home Bill was the crucial provision at stake in the constitutional
debate; it stated that where a dwelling has been occupied by a married couple at any time since
25 June 1993, the interest in the dwelling will vest in both spouses as joint tenants. One of the
main complaints about the bill is that it was retrospective in its application and affected the
rights of couples who bought homes prior to the enactment of the legislation. See Peter Ward,
The Supreme CourtFinds MatrimonialHome Bill 1993 Unconstitutional,supra, note 157, at 63.
159. See L v. L, (Ir. H. Ct.) (Unreported, Oct. 3, 1988); [1992] 2 I.R. 77 (Ir. S.C.), cited in
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man Lutheran in Germany in a Roman Catholic marriage ceremony.
The couple had returned to Ireland, where he purchased a large farm
and dilapidated eighteenth-century Georgian manor house. The wife
helped with the farming and played a pivotal role in restoring the
house to pristine condition. Almost from the start, the marriage relationship was a physically abusive one; the couple received a judicial
separation in 1988, and the wife sought a declaration under the Married Women's Status Act of 1957 in order to receive a share of the
farm in its furniture, fixtures, and fittings.1'6 The High Court granted
the wife judicial separation and maintenance; on the issue of a part in
the home ownership, the wife needed to prove that by her contributions to the property she relieved the husband of all or part of the financial burden of acquiring the property. The court found that the
wife did not meet this burden, finding that "a wife's work in the home
and in the care of the children or in the maintenance and enhancement of the property did not result in any beneficial ownership of the
'
property."161
Nevertheless, since the Constitution in Article 41.2 encouraged wives to forego such financial contributions and realize
their careers in the home, the wife in this case was entitled to 50% of
the house. 62 Justice Barr reasoned:
[because] her role as full-time wife and mother precludes her from
contributing directly or indirectly in money or money's worth from
independent employment or avocation towards the acquisition by
the husband of the family home and contents, her work as homemaker and in caring for the family shall be taken into account in
calculating her contribution towards that acquisition-particularly
as such work is of real monetary value.1 o
The crucial significance of this case is that it was the first to
deem a housewife entitled to a beneficial interest in the family home
based on her constitutional rights as outlined in Article 41. This arguably gave for the first time "full expression to the very special posi-

Sora O'Doherty, L v. L: "With All My Worldly Goods I Don't Thee Endow", 2 IR. STUDENT L.

REv. 5 (1992).
160. The Married Women's Status Act of 1957 consolidated the laws dealing with the status
of married women and codified the status of a married woman as the same as an unmarried

woman when considering the disposition and ownership of property. Property disputes involving married women were governed by section 12 of the Act. Note that section 12 has been

replaced by section 36 of the Family Law Act of 1995. See WALLS AND BERGIN, supra note
102, at 67.
161. O'Doherty, supranote 159, at 6.
162. See L v. L, (Ir. H. Ct, Unreported), Oct. 3, 1988; see also [1992] 2 I.R. 77 (Ir. S.C.),
discussed in O'CONNOR, supranote 67, at 228.
163. O'CONNOR, supranote 67, at 230 (quoting Justice Barr).
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tion which the family occupies in the Constitution. 1
The husband appealed to the Supreme Court, which accordingly
reversed the holding of the High Court, arguing that the High Court
had actually not upheld the right of the housewife as outlined in Article 41 as much as it had created out of that right a new right to beneficial interest in property and that this derivative right was nothing
short of a usurpation by the court of the legislative function." This
turn of events left the law in as much confusion as it was prior to litigation. The Supreme Court decision perpetuated a disconcerting
state of affairs in a system that lauds and sets apart the institution of
marriage and of the family and the role of the woman in the home.
In the minds of the Supreme Court justices, there was no concomitant acknowledgement of the woman's contribution in the home.
The Family Law Act of 1995 attempted to set this problem to rest
once and for all. The Act gave to the courts extended powers over
ancillary orders following judicial separation decrees. Especially significant are greater powers granted to resolve money and property
disputes.1"
E. The 1995 Divorce Referendum
Owing to the growing awareness of the lasting sociological
problems associated with marital breakdown, and as a result of the
continued lobbying by divorce proponents, by 1995 government officials believed the time was propitious to' seek yet another divorce
referendum. Anti-divorce lobbyists geared up once more for what
proved to be another hard battle. Many criticized the government
for siding with the divorce proponents; in the words of one journalistcritic,
[F]rom the point of view of family stability, Ireland is in an enviable
position, and vulnerable children are at incomparably lower risk of
being grievously hurt. But these factors ... seemingly count for

nothing among blinkered political legislators obsessed with bringing
Ireland into the mainstream of modem culture and morality,16 7however degenerate, depraved and... deeply harmful to society.
But the anti-divorce campaigners had been undermined by the
weakened state of their main support, the Roman Catholic Church,
164. Id. at 231.
165. See O'Doherty, supranote 159, at 9.
166. Family Law Act, § 36(2) (1995).
167. Desmond Rushe, Ireland'sForgotten Empire, HUMAN LIFE REV., Summer 1994, at 75,
82. Desmond Rushe was a longtime theater critic and columnist for the Irish Independent
newspaper.
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which had been forced to spend much of its energy responding to a
series of unseemly sex scandals. The most prominent of these were
the 1993 disclosure of Bishop Casey of Galway's mistress and his
eighteen-year-old child, and the 1995 numerous court proceedings
against Brendan Smyth, a Catholic priest who had molested at least
thirty-six children during his forty-year career, with the knowledge of
his Church superiors." Numerous other clergy child-molestation
cases emerged during this time, along with the revelation that many
of the offending priests were removed from Ireland by the Catholic
Church and
sent over to America with no mention of their
"records."169 After the death of Father Michael Cleary, a Dublin
priest and well-known defender of Pope John Paul I's ultraconservative agenda, his housekeeper of many years admitted that
she and the priest had been married privately and were the parents of
two grown children.'
The Bishops' lobby was, understandably, not as successful as it
had been in 1986, because in the eyes of the public the moral authority with which the Church in Ireland purported to speak had been so
thoroughly discredited. Their attempts to lobby forcefully were met
with cutting and perceptive jibes such as "[L]et the Bishops look after
their own families [referring to Bishop Casey's clandestine marriage
and children]."' 7' The "No" side maintained that divorce would have
an adverse effect on children;' in light of Brendan Smyth and other
child-abusing priests these admonitions tended to ring hollow. The
disaffection that many Roman Catholics felt for their church was
tellingly revealed by the significant drop in regular mass attendance.' 3
The weakened Catholic Church and the concomitant weakness
of the "No" campaign was inversely proportional to the vigor of the
"Yes" campaign; the rising number of separation decrees granted in-

168. Boyd Tonkin, Dublin'sSplitting Headache,NEW STATESMAN & Soc., Dec. 1, 1995, at

22-23; see also Death of an Evil Man, IR. VOICE, Aug. 27-Sept. 2,1997, at 10.
169. Brian Rohan, Irish Divorce Hangs in the Balance, IR.VOICE, Nov. 22-28,1995, at 20.

170. See Bruce Wallace, Letter From Ireland:Of Faithand Divorce:Another Yes Versus No
Referendum-On the Other Kind of Separation, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 27, 1995, at 31; see also
Conor Ryan, CriticalMass, NEv STATESMAN & Soc., Sept. 1,1995, at 22.
171. Brian Rohan, supranote 169, at 20.
172. See John Spain, Divorce on a Knife Edge, IR.VOICE, Nov. 22-28,1995, at 8. A notable
billboard in the No-Divorce Campaign read: "Hello Divorce ... Bye Bye Daddy ... Vote
NO!" Ia-

173. weekly mass attendance in 1974 stood at 91%; by November, 1995 regular attendance
had dropped to 64%, according to one poll. See Wallace, supranote 170, at 31.

210

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8:175

dicated the degree to which couples were finding ways to split up despite the ban on divorce. Statistics comparing 1986 marital status
with that of 1991 reveal an increase in all areas of divorce, separation,
and desertion. For example, an examination of the marital status of
once-married women in 1986 and 1991 reveals the following:174

Marital Status of Women

1986

1991

Married

653,586

667,051

Separated

22,607

33,793

Deserted

9,038

16,904

Marriage annulled

540

722

Legally separated

3,888

5,974

Other separated

6,792

7,195

Divorced in another country

2,169

2,998

TOTAL

676,193

700,844

Separated as % of TOTAL

3.3

4.8

Another arrow in the "Yes" campaign's quiver was the growing
liberalization of the Irish in general, with liberalizing trends seen in
Ireland's membership in the EU, the influence of global media, the
decline of the family farm, and even the liberalization of church policy following Vatican 11.175 Where once there was consensus on moral
issues, now there was contention."6 Politicians, once able during the
1960s and 1970s to turn a blind eye to social and moral tensions, were

174. FAHEY AND LYONS, supra note 68.
175. See Brian Girvin, Social Change and Political Culture in the Republic of Ireland, 46
PARL. AFF. 380,384 (July 1993).

176. See id. at 385.
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no longer able to enjoy such a luxury." As a consequence of these
factors, the government felt confident enough of the outcome to call

for a referendum on a constitutional amendment allowing divorce, to
be held November 24, 1995.178
The government was much more active in the 1995 divorce cam-

paign than it had been in 1986, as were the major political parties. As
Mary O'Rourke, deputy leader of Fianna Fail (the political party

considered to be the inheritors of de Valera's political conservatism)
explained: "In 1986, we generally took a neutral line-which became
on odd occasions hostile. This time, the leadership line [of the party]
is in favour. There will be personal decisions at a local level, of
course. But it is a distinct difference."' 79 This sentiment was in fact
the one held by all Irish political parties." Voters opposing the referendum complained, and validly so, that the political powers were

ignoring the interests of a sizeable population."'
In preparation for its renewed divorce campaign, the govern177. See id. at 389.
178. The strictly-worded amendment was crafted in response to the public's fear of instituting a "quickie" divorce scheme and was designed to be more likely to overcome the objections of those who might otherwise fear the introduction of divorce. The amended Art. 41.3.2
was to read as follows:
A Court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriage where, but only where,
it is satisfied thati)at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have lived apart from
one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least four years during the
previous five years,
ii)there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the spouses,
iii)such provision as the court considers proper having regard to circumstances exists
or will be made for the spouses, any children of either or both of them and any other
person prescribed by law, and
iv)any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with.
Peter Ward, Second Time Around, supra note 149; see also Government Unveils Divorce Plans,
(visited Sept. 26, 1997) <http:lwww.iol.ie/resource/lip/noilseptl7IR. ON-LINE
95/divorce.html>. Note that the amendment as enacted adds these provisions to the Constitution verbatim. See infra note 215.
179. Ryan, supranote 170, at 22.
180. See Wallace, supranote 170, at 31.
181. See Ryan, supra note 170, at 22; see also discussion of Des Hanafin case, infra notes
202-215 and accompanying text.
Some critics pointed their fingers at prominent politicians such as Dick Spring (Labour T.D.
and Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister; pronounced tawn-ush-teh)) and Bertie Ahern (Fianna
Fail Party leader) for promoting not just social and legislative goals but also personal interests.
Dick Spring is married to an American divorcee; and Bertie Ahem makes no secret of the fact
that he has been long separated from his wife and has established a long-term relationship of
over ten years with Celia Larkin. See Alan Murdoch, You Can Divorce, But Why Hurry?: Irish
Marriage Will Survive Change in Law, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 23, 1997, at 10; see also
Bertie's GirlMovin' On Up, IR. VOIcE, Jul. 9-15, 1997, at 2.
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ment commissioned a study of divorce and of the legislative elements
that would need to be involved in the implementation of any divorce
referendum. Its study, The Right to Remarry: A Government Information Paperon the Divorce Referendum, published only two months
before the scheduled referendum, argued strongly for the amendment of the Constitution in favor of divorce." Having learned from
the mistakes made in the 1986 campaign, the government sought not
only to inform the public about policies that would be implemented if
divorce were introduced in Ireland, but also to remind voters of provisions already in force at the time to assist individuals and families in
dealing with the consequences of marital breakdown.1" In fact,
eighteen specific pieces of legislation were already in place that alleviated many of the problems associated with divorce and answered
questions that had troubled voters in the 1986 referendum."8 As part
of the government's efforts to secure support for divorce, it launched
a sophisticated advertising campaign. " For its expenditures on this
component of its campaign, the government came under criticism for
its excess.' 6
Proponents of divorce resurrected some of the time-honed arguments in favor of divorce that were used in 1986, such as the need
to give deserted spouses a second chance; the need to respect minority (especially Protestant) rights; the need to insure that second relationships are given legal recognition; and the need to eliminate the
legal and moral ambiguities within which large numbers of Irish
found themselves. Those in both the "Yes" and "No" camps agreed
that marital breakdown was a severe Irish social problem. Leaders of
the "Yes" camp reminded voters that divorce is the product of
breakdown, not the cause of it.1"
Opponents acknowledged that divorce may not cause marital
breakdown, at least not in Ireland where it was not allowed, but they
182. See THE RIGHT TO REMARRY: A GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PAPER ON THE
DIVORcE REFERENDUM, P1. 1932, (1995).
183. See id. at 5.
184. See THE RIGHT TO REMARRY, supranote 182, at 69-70.
185. See The Referendum on Divorce: The Government is asking you to vote YES (visited
September 28,1997) <httpilwww.iol.ieldivorcelvoteyes.html>.
186. The government purportedly spent over £500,000 (approx. US $800,000) on its prodivorce information campaign; a small percentage of this money was reserved for anti-divorce
messages (approx. £70,000, or US $112,000). See Government Unveils Divorce Plans (visited
Sept. 28, 1997) <http://www.iol.ie/resource/ip/noilsepl7-95/divorce.html>; see also text accompanying notes 199-200, infra.
187. See William Duncan, Abortion, Divorce and the Debate about Liberty, in LAW AND
LIBERTY IN IRELAND 120,127 (Anthony Whelan ed., 1993).
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believed that were divorce to be made available it would lead only to
further breakdown; it would "undermine, destabilise, and devalue
marriage, contrary to the constitutional guarantee by the State to
protect the family and the institution of marriage.""' Furthermore,
children would be severely damaged as a result of divorce, and wives
would be beggared.' s
Over the course of the campaign, support for the referendum
varied greatly. Early on, polls showed a two-to-one majority favoring
divorce."9 But as the weeks passed, several members of Parliament
raised their voices in protest, despite the official support by all parties
of the proposed amendment. 9 ' Although the liberal and upscale
suburbs of south Dublin were united in their support for the measure,
such concentrated support was not to be found in rural Ireland,
where voters were not particularly enamored of the liberal causes of
sophisticated Dublin." By the eve of the referendum the support for
and against the measure was evenly split. 93

When the votes of the November 24 Referendum were tallied
the results were 818,112 "for" and 810,592 "against" with a 7,520
majority in favor. With such a close vote, a petition for a recount was
inevitable; the new count found 818,889 "for" and 809,726 "against,"
or a majority of 8,163 votes, a mere 0.6% difference-the narrowest
margin of any of the constitutional amendment referenda to date."94
The largest concentration of "Yes" votes was in Dublin and environs;
in the Dublin area "Yes" votes were not limited to the affluent, lib188. CASES FOR AND AGAINST DIVORCE, (Information booklet produced by the Ad Hoe
Commissions on Referendum Information, established by the Government) (visited Sept. 28,

1997) <http'//nis.rtc-talaght.ie/sig/law.home/divorce2.html>.
189. See Duncan, supra note 186, at 127. A simple recitation of the arguments for and
against divorce fails to describe the passion and virulence with which the campaign was waged.
As noted previously the pro-divorce side cashed in on the degenerate behavior of priests. Antidivorce groups and individuals could also hit below the belt. "'You're all a shower of wife-

swapping sodomites," shouted an anti-divorce militant called Una Bean Mhic Mathuna to her
opponents at the Dublin area vote count. Earlier in the campaign, the pro-amendment Fine

Gael politician Alan Shatter [prominent family lawyer and author of the definitive text on Irish
family law] received a letter telling him that Ireland "does not need Jewish parasites like you to
advise the people how to live their lives .... Get out, you Jewish scum."' Tonkin, supra note

169, at 22.
190. See

Divorce

Jitters Ahead

of

Referendum

(visited

Sept.

28,

1997)

<http:llwww.iol.ie/resource/lip/noi/septlO-95/divorce.html>.

191. See id.
192. See Boyd Tonkin, supranote 168, at 23.
193. See id.
194. See Result: Divorce Carriedby Slimmest Majority after Recount, NEWS OF IR. (visited

Sept. 28,1997) <http:/www.iol.resouce/iplnoilnov22-95/divorce.htm>.
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eral southern suburbs, but came from all areas of the city, whose
eleven constituencies comprise almost half the nation's population.1"
After Dublin (including adjacent Dun Laoghaire), the other area
high in "Yes" votes was in the counties surrounding the capital. This
area corresponds roughly with the Pale, the old area of English settlement. Included in this area are the counties of Kildare, which returned a 57.65% affirmative vote; Louth on the north, a 51.75% vote;
Wicklow on the south, a 58.99% vote.1 6 The statistics for Dublin and
the Four Provinces of Ireland are as follows:"

Verdict
Majority

(%)
Electorate
Total Poll
Turnout (%)
Spoilt vote
Valid Poll
Yes

(%)
No

(%)

Dublin

Rest of Leinster

Munster

Connacht

Ulster

Yes
130,356
(27.11)
746,671
482,044
64.56
1218
480,826
305,591
(63.56)
175,235
(36.44

No
4,359
(1.16)
609,423
377,690
61.98
1345
376,345
185,993
(49.42)
190,352
(50.58)

No
58,138
(12.23)
759,405
476,906
62.80
1678
475,228
208,545
(43.88)
266,683
(56.12)

No
37,298
(18.90)
341,428
198,136
58.03
748
197,388
80,045
(40.55)
117,343
(59.45)

No
21,451
(21.71)
180,974
99,154
54.79
369
98,785
38,667
(39.14)
60,118
(60.86)

195. See Maura Adshead, Sea Change on the Isle of Saints and Scholars?: The 1995 Irish
Referendum on the Introduction of Divorce, 15 ELECrORAL STUD. 138,140 (1996).

196. Ireland Votes for Divorce-Just: Divorce Referendum Results (visited Sept. 28, 1997)
<http://vectra.adnet.ie/divorce.html>.

197. IR. TIMES statistics, Nov. 27, 1995, cited in Adshead, supra note 195, at 138.
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Several simultaneously occurring social changes may account for
the referendum results. The voting population of Ireland is becoming
younger and more urban. In addition, this population is no longer
uncritically deferential to the Catholic Church, on divorce or other
matters. One poll found that even of those voting "no," only 7%
cited the Church's teaching as the basis of their opposition.193 Additionally, the fact that all political parties supported divorce for the
first time in the history of the Republic may have been decisive. The
unanimity of the political parties on this moral issue may indicate the
advent of a political discourse more European in outlook: "Whereas
previously, Irish parties were distinguished almost exclusively by traditional cleavages based on the sides taken in the Irish Civil War,
they are now beginning to reflect alternative societal changes. ' 99
What some have called the "Robinson factor" also played a role in
the debate: as a young professional, lawyer, professor, mother, former Seanad member, and President who is Catholic but married to a
Protestant, Mary Robinson in lifestyle, belief, and political views embodied the essence of the modern and increasingly Euro-conscious
Irish identity.' Her pro-divorce enthusiasm was almost contagious.
For those sympathetic to the anti-divorce lobby, the spread of
this contagious enthusiasm was indeed akin to the spread of a disease
propagated by the government. The Irish government's involvement
with the "Yes" campaign prompted one concerned citizen to file suit
against the government immediately prior to the Referendum. The
Supreme Court in The Matter of Bunreacht Na htireann; Patricia
McKenna v. An Taoiseach, An Tanaiste and Other?'1 held that the
government was "acting in accordance with its rights in giving factual
information with regard to the proposal which was the subject of the
referendum, in expressing its views thereon and in urging the acceptance of such views," but that the government's actions, in spending
public funds for the "Yes" campaign, "amounted to an interference
with the democratic and constitution process for the amendment of
the Constitution and infringed the concept of equality which was
fundamental to the democratic nature of the State." The govern198. See Adshead, supra note 195, at 140.
199. Id.
200. See id.

201. See In the Matter of Bunreacht Na hi ireann; Patricia McKenna v. An Taoiseach, An
Tanaiste and Others, [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 81, availablein LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.

202. Id
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ment was thus compelled to discontinue its advertising campaign favoring divorce; but by the late date at which this order was given by
the court, a mere week before the scheduled referendum, most voters
had decided how they would vote.
The battle over the divorce referendum, however, did not end
with the vote in November, nor did it end with the nationwide recount that was petitioned for by the ultra-conservative group, Muintir
na h]fireann (People of Ireland).2 Former Senator and chairman of
the Anti-Divorce Campaign Des Hanafin' claimed that the governmental "interference" in the "Yes" campaign swung the divorce referendum in its favor and that, despite the Supreme Court's order for
the government to cease its lobbying, the lobbying continued on the
Internet.' Hanafin filed an official complaint within the required
seven-day window following the publication of the official tally in the
Iris Oifigiuil (Official Gazette);26 however, the Divisional High Court
rejected Hanafin's claim, stating that it found "the allegation that the
Government's unconstitutionally funded campaign had a significantly
persuasive influence on the electorate.., speculative and unsatisfac2
tory. 2
According to the provisions of the Referendum Act of 1994, the
High Court's valid adjudication of this constitutional issue is final;'
recourse to the Supreme Court following a High Court judgment is
precluded by this special provision within the Act. Article 34.4.3 of
the Constitution states that there is always a right to appeal to the
Supreme Court on issues of law except for "such exceptions and
subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law."' Hanafin
argued, however, that he held a special right to appeal to the Supreme Court, regardless of the special jurisdiction of the High Court
outlined in the Act. Since there was no preclusion of appeal stated
203. See Result Divorce Carried,supra note 194.

204. Labour politician Des Hanafin lost his Seanad seat in 1992, but was re-elected on
August 8, 1997. Michael O'Regan and Jimmy Walsh, Hanafin Returns to the Seanad with

Hopes to Overturn Divorce Decision, IR. TIMES, Aug. 8,1997, at 4.
205. See The Referendum on Divorce,supra note 185.
206. See Referendum Act of 1994, § 40(2), which outlines the publication in the Official
Gazette, while § 42(2) stipulates the seven-day window; see also Geraldine Kennedy, Petition
Against Validity of PollResult Likely to Go to High Court, IR. TIMES, Nov. 27,1995, at 1.

207. Hanafin v. Min. For Environment and Others, (Ir. H. Ct. Div.), No. 72 MCA, Feb. 7,
1996, (transcript), availablein LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.

208. See ReferendumAct of 1994, § 42(1).
209. IR. CONST. art. 34.4.3. For a discussion on the appellate jurisdiction of courts in civil
cases in Ireland, see generally RAYMoND BYRNE, THE IRISH LEGAL SYSTEM 231 (3d ed.,

1996); see also JAMES CASEY, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW INIRELAND 234 (1992).
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expressly within the body of the Referendum Act of 1994, Hanafin
concluded, his right to appeal should be sustained."t Within the body
of his appeal, Hanafin argued that the High Court had erroneously
interpreted provisions of the Referendum Act, in particular by too
narrowly interpreting section 43(1)( b) and (d),2 especially the language in this section which enables a legal challenge to a provisional
referendum certification due to interference with, or irregularities in,
the way the referendum is conducted."2 Hanafin maintained that because of these shortcomings in the Referendum, a new referendum
should be conducted. Because of the lack of clear legislative guidance in the Referendum Act of 1994 regarding a petition against the
validity of a referendum, Hanafin's case was considered appropriate
impression to be referred to the Supreme Court by
as a case of first
21 3
the High Court.
On hearing the case, the Supreme Court found that Hanafin had
failed to meet his burden of proof "on the balance of probabilities" to
show that
(1)"the nature and extent of the obstruction of or interference
with or other hindrance or mistake or other irregularity" [read,
"'constitutional wrongdoing"'], and
(2) "that such 'constitutional wrongdoing' materially affected the
result of the referendum as a whole."2 4
210. See David Gwynn Morgan, Success for Divorce PollAppeal Looks Unlikely: Proving
That the Government's Expenditure Caused the Yes Majority is Going to be Difficult if the Supreme CourtApproaches the Issue Literally, IR. TIMES, Apr. 30,1996, at 12.
211. See Referendum Act, 1994, § 43(1).
212. See In the Matter of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution (no. 2) Bill and in

the matter of a Referendum Petition pursuant to § 42 of the Referendum Act 1994; D Hanafin
v. Minister for the Environment, the Government of Ireland, the Attorney General and the
Referendum Returning Officer, and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Notice Party), [1996]
2 I.L.R.M. 161 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irend Library, Cases File. In the case the Supreme Court was asked to determine, inter alia, whether the government's "Yes" vote cam-

paign was unconstitutional in that it "altered the nature of that campaign from a permissible
communication of information to an impermissible interference with the free will of the elec-

torate," and whether this constituted "interference" within the meaning of the Referendum
Act. See id. at 161.
213. See id. Since the Referendum Act did not provide for any mechanism to allow for the
freely given votes of the people in a referendum after they had been tallied to be overturned
judicially, the Court entertained a hearing to consider whether Hanafin would be given the

right to appeal. See Christine Newman, AG seeks Dismissalof Hanafin'sHigh Court Challenge
to Divorce Poll, IR. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1996, at 8.Hanafin argued that nowhere in the Referendum Act of 1994 was it clearly, expressly, and unambiguously stated that there was no right to
appeal to the Supreme Court on a referendum petition. See Hanafin Can Appeal to Supreme

Court, I. TIMES, Mar. 2,1996, at 4.
214. In the Matter of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution, [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 161
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Justice Blaney stated that the Divisional (High) Court had properly decided the case and that accordingly no appeal to the Supreme
Court was warranted.215 All other Justices agreed."6 Immediately
following this unanimous decision, the results of the divorce referendum were formally signed by the High Court in June 1996, pursuant
to the regulations set out in section 57 of the Referendum Act of
1994.217

F. The Family (Divorce) Law of 1996
With these hurdles out of the way, the long-awaited divorce leg-

islation was at last able to be introduced for passage through the Diil
and Seanad. By late June 1996, the Divorce bill was published,"8 and
throughout the summer and early autumn was reviewed and debated

by the Oireachtas. During the debates some members expressed
long-held reservations about divorce in general,219 yet there was no
express opposition to the bill on the floor of the Oireachtas.'
In the main, the bill was quite restrictive in the conditions couples seeking divorce were required to fulfill before their cases could
(Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
215. Justice Blaney stated that the evidence that the Divisional [High] Court chose to admit
was fully within its discretion, and that the evidence did not prove that the government's conduct altered the outcome of the referendum. See id.
216. See id. Des Hanafin, having won back his seat in the Seanad in August 1997, has
stated that he plans on becoming active in the attempt to overturn the divorce decision legislatively. O'Regan and Walsh, supra note 194, at 4. Other No-divorce campaigners are also
committed to seeing the Divorce laws overturned. As Dr. Gerard Casey, vice-chairman of the
No-Divorce Campaign, vowed, "We have not yet begun to fight. We will torment people for
the next 40, 50, 60 years." Geraldine Kennedy, No-Divorce Campaign to Seek New Referendum, IR.TIMES, Jun. 14,1996, at 9.
217. See Referendum Act (1994) § 57; see also Christine Newman, Result of Divorce Referendum is Formally Signed By High Court, IR.TIMES, Jun. 15, 1996, at 4. The resulting 15th
Amendment to the Irish Constitution modified Article 41.3.2, which now states, in its entirety:
A Court designated by law may grant of a dissolution of marriage where, but only
where, it is satisfied thati.at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have lived apart from
one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least four years during the
previous five years,
ii.there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the spouses,
iil.such provision as the Court considers proper having regard to the circumstances
exists or will be made for the spouses, any children of either or both of them and any
other person prescribed by law, and
iv.any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with.
IR.CONST. art. 41.3.2, amended by IR. CONST. amend. XV.
218. See Carol Coulter, "No-fault" Divorce Basis Not Debated. The Divorce Bill, Published
This Week, Includes Both Conservativeand Liberal Elements, IR.TIMES, Jun. 21,1996, at 14.
219. See Divorce Bill Passes Second Stage, IR. TIMES, Jun. 28, 1996, at 11.

220. See id.
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be heard. This was understandable, given that the constitutional
mandate to uphold the family in Article 41 remained in place. Some
conservative critics of the bill were quick to note that any standard
that was more liberal than strictly fault-based divorce was far too liberal for them."2 The bill as passed closely resembled the Judicial
Separation and Foreign Divorces Recognition Act of 1989, with the
only major alteration being the permission of separated persons to
remarry. Although divorce as defined in the legislation was to be no
fault, issues of fault would necessarily be involved in the determination of property and maintenance orders associated with the divorce
action, since the court was to base its assessment of monetary relief
regarding property and maintenance on an evaluation of, among
other things, the "conduct of the spouses."' The Dil passed the bill
perfunctorily and without a vote,m and after passage through the Seanad, and being signed by President Robinson, the law went into effect on February 27, 1997.
The Act was largely an unaltered version of the bill that was initially presented to the Ddil. The Act encouraged persons to settle
marital difficulties first through counseling, then mediation, and only
finally through separation and divorce proceedings. 4 Solicitors who
represent the parties in divorce proceedings must certify in writing to
the court2 that the parties had been informed of the benefits of reconciliation, counselling, mediation and judicial separation.2 6 Solicitors are even encouraged to try their hand at assisting in the reconciliation process.'
"Quickie divorces," as the popular Irish press referred to divorces without a preliminary separation period,' were prohibited by
the strict time provisions outlined in the Act. Section Five of the Act
stated that the court would consider divorce actions only when the

221. Coulter, supra note 218, at 14. For a discussion of the no-fault basis of the proposed
divorce legislation in Ireland, see Christopher Price, Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law, 19
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. LJ. 669, 669 (1997).

222. See Family (Divorce) Act, 1996, § 20(2)(a)-(1).
223. See Divorce Bill to Go to Seanad After PassingFinal Stage Without a Vote, IR. TIMES,

Sept. 26, 1996, at 8.
224. See Family (Divorce) Act, 1996, § 6.
225. See id-, § 6(4)(a).
226. See id., § 7.
227. See id., § 7.
228. Liam Kelly, Dil Cuts the Tie in Loveless Marriages:Ddil Passes Irish Divorce Bill,

Daily Mirror, Sept. 26, 1996, at 2; Introducing Divorce, IR. TIMES (editorial comment), Sept.
26, 1997, at 15.
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spouses had satisfied all the following prerequisites:
(a) at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses
have lived apart from one another for a period of, or periods
amounting to, at least four years during the previous five years,
(b) there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the
spouses, and such provision as the court considers proper having
regard to the circumstances exists or will 229
be made for the spouses
and any dependent members of the family.

A feature of the Act noted by some observers is its provision for
joint custody of children in section 10(2); this addresses the concern
of some that mothers would be the sole custodians and that fathers
would thus be permanently deprived of their custodial rights. 3
Despite the easy passage of the bill, implementation of the Act

was cause for concern. Particular worries were the high cost of divorce;' the flood of anticipated divorce cases' the lack of adequate
facilities for mediation;' and the burden placed on the courts,"

229. Family (Divorce) Act, 1996, § 5 (1)(a)-(c).
230. Section 10(2) states that a decree of divorce will not affect the right of the child's parents to joint custody. See Family (Divorce) Act, 1996, § 10(2).
231. See Sinead Conneely, The Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996: Some Observations, IR. L.
TIM S, Apr. 1997, at 78, 80. A letter to the editor from a parental-rights activist lauded the Divorce Bill for its inclusion of joint custody. See Joint Custody, IR. TIMES, Jun. 26, 1996, at 15.
232. On average, an uncontested divorce would cost in the range of £3,000-5,000, subject to
an additional 21% Value Added Tax. Contested divorces would cost more, especially if disputes over property or child psychiatrist assessments are involved. See So You Want a Divorce?, IR. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 6. Lawyers, it has been commented, stand to gain the most
out of the Family (Divorce) Act, since solicitors are required to submit certificates to the court
on their client's behalf, such as the certificate stating that reconciliation of the marriage was
discussed. Sinead Ni Chuluchain, a family lawyer, stated that unlike England, none of these
certificates can be accepted by post. Thus costs for the solicitor's presence at the courthouse
become a significant financial consideration. See David Sharrock, No Stampede in Prospectfor
Divorce Irish-Style, GuARDIAN (London), Feb. 27,1997, at 11.
233. Estimates of the number of individuals who might desire to avail themselves of divorce
under the new act varied from sixty to eighty thousand. See Kelly, supra note 226, at 2; So You
Want a Divorce?, supra note 230, at 6. Even conservative estimates anticipated 10,000 individuals applying for divorce during the first year of the act. See Mark O'Connell, Ireland's
Family Justice is Now in Crisis,LAWYER, Sept. 3,1996, at 12.
234. Mediation in Ireland is "underdeveloped and underregulated to cope with the demand
for these services." The Advent of Divorce, IR. TIMES (editorial), Feb. 28, 1997, at 13. "Private
mediators are unregulated at the moment, and their fees can vary widely. The Institute of Mediators runs a register of trained mediators, but there is no legal obligation [for] people calling
themselves mediators to register with it and there is nothing to stop anyone setting up as a mediator, advertising in the Golden Pages and charging what they like." Carol Coulter, Divorce
Became Law Yesterday, But Support Services for Those Seeking Divorce, and Information on
the Workings of the FamilyCourts, Remain Sadly Inadequate,IR. TIMES, Feb. 28,1997, at 12.
235. See Divorce Bill to Go to Seanad,supranote 223, at 8.
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which were ill-prepared for the forecast onslaught. 6 The initial fears
about an overwhelming number of applications proved to be unwarranted, as the stringent time restrictions in the Act helped to stem the
flow of applications to the courts. Furthermore, the concern of applicants that they would be the first test cases may have prompted many
to delay their applications until the administrative details were
worked out.
There could not have been a more appropriate first divorce case
in Ireland than RC v. CC' to illustrate the need for such legislation.
A man in his late fifties or early sixties, suffering from a terminal illness and in danger of imminent death, petitioned the court for divorce, so that he could marry the woman with whom he had been
living for many years and with whom he had a daughter."I The children of his first marriage were all adult, some having children of their
own. Due to the severity of his illness, he petitioned the High Court
to grant him a divorce prior to the official date the divorce legislation
was to come into force.2' The High Court granted his request because it concluded that the effective date set by the Family (Divorce)
Act 1996, February 27, 1997, was not constitutionally mandated and
was consequently not binding on the court's ability to adjudicate the
constitutional amendment," which was established and valid the day
the referendum results were accepted by the government. 24 2 Thus,
the High Court was not obligated to wait for specific terms set forth
in enabling legislation. Only a few days after receiving his divorce243
and remarrying, the plaintiff died.2

236. James Nugent, Chair of the Irish Bar Council, argued that more funding and additional
judges were needed in order to forestall a "courts deadlock." An overriding problem is the everyday operation of the judicial system: "the recent appointment of 10 new judges will do a lot to
help but the management of the courts has always been such a hit-or-miss affair," concluded
Nugent. Mark O'Connell, supra note 233, at 12.
237. See Carol Coulter, Introduction of Divorce into Irish Legal System Fails to Open any
Floodgates,IR. TIMES, Feb. 28,1997, at 7.
238. See RC v. CC, [1997] 1 I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. H. Ct.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library,
Cases File.
239. See Geraldine Kennedy, First Divorce Case Since Referendum, IR. TIMEs, Jan. 15,
1997, at 1; see also Geraldine Kennedy and Christine Newman, Divorcee Wants to Remarry
Soon, IR. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at 1.
240. The legislation came into force on February 27,1997.
241. RC v. CC, supranote 238, at 403.
242. This occurred only days after the Supreme Court dismissed Des Hanafin's appeal. See
supra note 217 and accompanying text.
243. See Divorcee Given Leave to Marry, IR. TIMES, Jan. 25,1997, at 6.
244. See Man GrantedFirstIrish Divorce Dies,MAIL ON SUNDAY, Feb. 2,1997, at 2.
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VI. ANALYSIS
"Divorce entered the Irish legal system.., not with a bang, but a
whimper.""4 5 This statement summarizes not only the immediate reaction of Irish divorce-seekers to the introduction of divorce in Ireland, but also reflects the extent to which other legislation had largely
addressed the broader implications of marital breakdown over the
previous two decades. Although the administrative system was not as
prepared as it might have been for the keystone provision of divorce,
the legal infrastructure and the mechanisms in place to implement
the laws had long been constructed. Divorce and the recognition of
marital breakdown, arguably the most contentious social debate in
Ireland, is the last of several recent issues to be addressed legislatively in an attempt to liberalize Ireland's social agenda, and to remove Ireland, finally, from some of the most stifling constraints of de
Valera's national image.A
Although de Valera's notion of an idealized social life was held
by most citizens of the Irish Free State at the time the Constitution
was put in place, opponents vehemently criticized his codification of
family life. Many small groups, among them strong feminist groups,
lobbied heavily for the scrapping of the 1937 Constitution's provisions regarding women and their place in the home. Many women
were appalled at the proposed 1937 Constitution;47 one active suffragette concluded that de Valera's "ideal is the strictly domestic type of
woman who eschews 'politics' as male concerns, the Fascist ideal now
working under Mussolini and Hitler." The changing role of women
in the social, political, and economic life in Ireland over the last decades has rendered the ideal of the strictly domestic mother/wife embodied in the Constitution impossible to maintain. With active involvement in the political process, women such as former President
Mary Robinson and current President Mary McAleese testify to the
position that women have come to hold in the formation of new Irish
political policy. The male-centered ethos in the Constitution may
remain in its continued idealization of woman's domestic role, but

245. Carol Coulter, Introduction of Divorce into Irish Legal System Fails to Open Any
Floodgates,supranote 237, at 7.
246. Other examples of this liberalizing trend can be seen in the de-criminalization of homosexual acts between consenting adults and the lawful availability of contraceptives and of
abortion information. See Adshead, supranote 195, at 142.
247. See COOGAN, supranote 1, at 496.
248. CLIFFORD, supra note 7, at 138 (quoting Hanna Sheehy Skiffington's opinion in the
Irish Press, May 13, 1937).
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the ideology once supporting it has eroded.
Not for women alone has the world of the Constitution changed.
As evident in the legal battles throughout the decades since the
promulgation of the Constitution, social and political controversies
guide the ongoing judicial and legislative dialogue on national issues.
One of the principal impediments to free and candid discussion and
policy implementation in Ireland is the practice of enshrining in the
Constitution policies which in other nations would probably be handled by legislation; forcing social change to occur only through nationwide referenda guarantees that such change will be difficult,
which, arguably, was de Valera's goal. On certain issues, such as
family life, de Valera and his compatriots saw no need to build into
the Constitution any flexibility, as the Constitution was meant to
codify the ideal Ireland. In keeping with a utopian ideal, de Valera
attempted to eliminate all rival visions of Ireland by "affirming the
absolute rightness of his visions of the ideal state."249 The prohibition
of divorce was a logical consequence of upholding the vision of Ireland as a Catholic state. If de Valera feared that any change in attitude toward divorce would be the result of a Protestant-inspired
apostasy, he was mistaken; marriages break down in Ireland for the
same reasons that they do in any other country, such as the need for
dual incomes and related economic needs concomitant with modern
life which strain the marital relationship. Thus, Irish politicians after
de Valera were left with the uneasy task of squaring an ideal Constitution with the realities of evolving modem Irish life.
An additional complicating factor in the divorce debate is the
impact of family law in the Republic of Ireland on Ireland's northern
neighbor. Without divorce legislation in place, reunification debates
between Northern Ireland and the Republic would be strained. The
new availability of divorce in the Republic of Ireland helps to rebut
one of the frequent arguments of Northern Irish Protestants, namely
that the South is dominated by a Catholic social agenda. Moderates
in the North, like some politicians in the South, hope that divorce
legislation will smooth the path toward reunification."0 For the average Irish man or woman in the South, however, the implications of
the divorce legislation to the larger North/South debate was largely
irrelevant; they voted for or against the referendum out of concern
for its effect on their own lives and the lives of those around them,

249. KmHS-AN KUMAR, UTOPIANISM 90 (1991) (discussing Karl Popper's views on utopias).

250. See Adshead, supra note 195, at 141.
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not out of any larger political motive." In the North, the extreme
opponents of any union with the Republic, such as the Rev. Ian
Paisley, are similarly indifferent to any position taken on divorce by
the Southern electorate. =2 It remains to be seen whether or not the
presence of divorce in the South will have any effect on the reunification process.
Ireland, long the holdout as the only member of the EU to have
no law permitting divorce, now enjoys a political and legislative record more in keeping with European policies and laws. Ireland's self
image has changed noticeably during the last half of the twentieth
century, particularly with the accession of the country to the EU:
The kind of society set in train in the early sixties and reinforced in
the seventies by our accession to the [EU] has created a situation of
dependence. We seem to have become totally reliant on others to
provide the answers to our many problems. Our own institutions
appear to have failed us completely. Someone once wrote "the
shape of Irish society (and institutions) fits the Irish people like a
badly tailored suit; we do not acknowledge the suit as our own, we
do not feel at home
' ' 3 in it, but we tolerate it as we have always tolerated everything.

2

Through legislation such as the constitutional amendment permitting divorce, Ireland has in recent years attempted to make its institutions fit its citizenry more comfortably and match developments
in Europe more faithfully. For the first time, Ireland can parallel its
unsurpassed economic strength within the EU24 with a family social
policy approaching that of Europe's most progressive countries.
Both opponents and supporters of divorce have pointed to the
decline in religious observance as an indication of the spiritual temperature of modern Ireland.'S This cooling of religious zeal does not
entail a complete rejection of Ireland's strong Catholic heritage;
there is little doubt that the Church will continue its social, spiritual,
and cultural mission in this revised context, as it has in the face of
many similar hurdles throughout history. Indicative of the hold of
the Church's position is the slim margin of victory of the divorce proponents during the 1995 referendum. Clerical and lay opposition

251. See id.
252. See Albert Menendez, supranote 16, at 8.
253. Bobby Ballagh, Responding, in AcRoss THE FRONTIERS: IRELAND IN THE 1990s:
CULTURAL-POLrICAL-ECONOMIC 199,201 (Richard Kearney ed., 1988).
254. Ireland's economy has become one of the great success stories in the EU in recent
years. See IrelandShines, ECONOMIST, May 17,1997, at 16.
255. See Wallace, supranote 170, at 31.
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continues, as can be seen in the commitment of Des Hanafin to overturn the constitutional amendment permitting divorce and in the
Church's unwavering belief in the indissolubility of marriage. What
has been shaken in the divorce debate is the bond, both actual and
assumed, between the Catholic Church and the Irish state; no longer
can the Church rely on the government to enshrine Church teaching
in legislation as a matter of course. With this latest divorce battle
behind it, the Church may well regain some portion of its former
moral authority, and re-emerge as a focus of Irish social and religious
life in the years to come.
A renewed and reinvigorated Church presence in Ireland, however, is unlikely to undo the complete social agenda involving family
life that has emerged within the past thirty years. Indeed, it is arguable that the Church would not desire to dismantle all of the legislation put in place on family matters, since many provisions for women
and children are humanitarian measures seen to be laudable regardless of one's position on divorce. The changes wrought in family law
leading up to both the 1986 and 1995 Referenda accomplished many
of the social goals sought by legislators and citizens alike to confront
the problem of marital breakdown-a problem recognized and acknowledged as imperative for redress by both proponents and opponents of divorce. The passage of the constitutional amendment permitting divorce was not, therefore, as unexpected or as shocking a
development as many observers believed, for many of the societal
and legal changes affecting family relations had been put in place
well before the 1995 Referendum. With the provision of divorce,
spouses of broken marriages have been given the right to remarry.
This right stands as a central component in an array of legislative options established over the decades for individuals in broken marriages. Divorce is the capstone on the edifice of modern Irish family
law.
VII. CONCLUSION
What now for Ireland? The long-term effects of divorce legislation remain to be seen, as does the course of marital patterns as a result of the availability of divorce. Certainly the fears of those concerned about a flood of divorces did not materialize within the first
months of divorce legislation; from February to June 1997, only 244
divorce applications had been processed and only 64 divorces
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granted. 6 Will Ireland still be able to fulfill its constitutional obligation to support the institution of marriage? A Commission on the
Family established by the government thinks so, and offers hopeful
recommendations for the continued vibrancy of the family in its publication Strengthening Families for Life.'7 In this way, the government seeks to pay homage to de Valera's vision of a family-centered
nation while admitting the realities of marital breakdown and contemporary social patterns. Ireland is now in a position to offer to
those couples whose marriages are irretrievably broken arguably the
best option for renewal-divorce and the chance to begin again.
Christine P. James

256. See DivorceFiguresShow 244 Applications,IR. VOICE, Sept. 3-9,1997, at 4.
257. Cited in WALLS AND BERGIN, supra note 102, at 7.
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APPENDIX
THE JURISDICTION OF THE IRISH COURTS AND
RELEVANT LEGISLATION REGARDING FAMILY
MATTERS
The Irish court system is composed of the District Court (the
lowest court); the Circuit Court (8 districts, Cork and Dublin with
permanent judges, other jurisdictions with a judge of the High Court
riding circuit); the High Court (jurisdiction over the whole country,
usually sits in Dublin, can hear constitutional matters); the Special
Criminal Court; the Court of Criminal Appeal; and the Supreme
Court (court of last resort; can entertain cases concerning legislation's constitutionality after it has been voted on by the Ddil and Seanad but before the legislation is promulgated; President can refer a
piece of legislation of questionable constitutionality to the court for
review) 28

258. See RAYMOND BYRNE AND J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, THE IRISH LEGAL SYSTEM (2d
ed., 1989); V.T.H. DELANY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN IRELAND (rev. ed., 1975);
BRIAN DOOLAN, PRINCIPLES OF IRISH LAW (3d ed., 1991). See also WALLS AND BERGIN, supra note 102, at 295 Appendix 3.
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District Court
1. Custody/access
2. Maintenance (up
to £200 per week for
wife)( up to £60 per
week for child)includes mother
seeking maintenance
for children born
outside marriage
3. Barring orders
(Max. 3 yrs.)
4. Safety orders
(Max. 5 yrs.)
5. Protection orders
6. Application under section 9 of the
Family Home Protection Act 1976 (re:
disposal of household goods)
7. Care orders and
fit person orders
8. Lump sum orders
up to £5,000

Circuit Court
1. Decree of divorce and all ancillary relief under the Family Law (Divorce) Act
1996
2. Judicial separation and ancillary relief
under the Judicial Separation and Family
Law Reform Act 1989 and the Family Law
Act 1995
3. Custody/access
4. Maintenance (no limit)
5. Barring orders (no limit)
6. Affiliation orders (no limit)
7. Appeals from the district court
8. Applications under section 36 of the
Family Law Act 1995, Partition Acts,
Family Home Protection Act 1976, and
Family Law Act 1981.
9. Application to have separation agreement made a rule of court under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and
Children) Act 1976 and application to
have agreement between parents who are
not married in relation to child maintenance etc., made a rule of court
10. Application under Succession Act
1965

11. Nullity applications (Family Law Act
1995, § 39)
12. Application for declaration as to

marital status
13. Interim maintenance orders
14. Periodical payments pending suit orders
(Any property which may be the subject
matter of any of the above orders must
have a rateable valuation of less than

£200)
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High Court
1. Decree of divorce
and all ancillary relief
under the Family Law
(Divorce) Act 1996
2. Judicial separation
and ancillary relief
(under the 1989 and
1995 Acts)
3. Application under
section 36 of the
Family Law Act 1995
4. Application under
the Adoption Acts
1974 and 1987 (High
Court only)
5. Nullity application
6. Application under
Succession Act 1965
7. Application to
have a separation
agreement made a
rule of court under
the Family law
(Maintenance of
Spouses and Children) Act 1976
8. Appeals from circuit court
9. Applications for
declaration as to
marital status
10. Applications for
interim maintenance
orders
11. Applications for
periodical payments
pending suit orders

